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THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
oOo 
LON S. NIELD, et al., 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellees, 
vs. 
B. J. RONE, et al., 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
B. J. RONE, et al., 
Third Party 
Plaintiffs. 
vs. 
ASSOCIATED TITLE COMPANY, et al. 
Third Party 
Defendants. 
Case No. 
Decision No. None 
Docket No. 900187-CA 
PETITION FOR WRIT OP CERTIORARI 
QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW 
1. Should the true identity and connection with the 
ultimate l iab i l i ty holder of adopted pseudonymous business 
names be judicially declared before rules of c i v i l procedure 
pertaining to parties and service of due process are applied? 
2. I s a h o l d i n g i n one c a s e t h a t a c e r t a i n p e r s o n was 
n o t a proper p a r t y upon whom s e r v i c e could be made on c e r t a i n 
CASE TITLE 1 
p s e u d o n y m o u s b u s i n e s s n a m e p a r t i e s r e s j u d i c a t a i n v o i d i n g 3 
a d d i t i o n a l j u d g m e n t s i n v o l v i n g d i f f e r e n t j u d g m e n t d e f e n d a n t s and 
a l s o d i f f e r e n t p e r s o n s who r e c e i v e d s e r v i c e of p r o c e s s ? 
3 . What c o n s t i t u t e s t h e e l e m e n t of a f u l l a n d f a i r 
h e a r i n g f o r r e s j u d i c a t a c o l l a t e r a l e s t o p p e l a p p l i c a t i o n a n d d o e s 
newly f o u n d e v i d e n c e b e a r a n i n f l u e n c e on d e t e r m i n i n g a " f u l l " o r 
c o m p l e t e h e a r i n g ? 
4 . In miT i p l e p a r t y l i t i g a t i o n , d o e s a j u d i c i a l l i e n 
a t t a c h and t h e r ic, t o e x e c u t e a c c r u e t o a j u d g m e n t c r e d i t o r 
e v e n t h o u g h Rule 4b c e r t i f i c a t i o n h a s n e t b e e n o b t a i n e d ? 
5 . I s t h e a p p e a l of a p p e l l a n t s t r u l y f r i v o l o u s j u s t i f y i n g 
A p p e l l e e s a URAP 33 a w a r d of a t t o r n e y f e e s a n d d o u b l e c o s t s ? 
OPINION OP THE COURT OF APPEALS 
N o n e 
STATEMENT OP JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
J a n u a r y 2 8 , 1 9 9 1 Ut . C t . A p p e a l s O r d e r of A f f i r m a n c e 
F e b r u a r y 2 0 , 1 9 9 1 O r d e r E x t e n d i n g T ime t o F i l e t o March 2 9 , 1 9 9 1 
7 8 - 2 - 2 ( 3 ) ( a ) UCA 1 9 5 3 
NATURE OP THE PROCEEDING 
Summary j u d g m e n t g r a n t e d P l a i n t i f f A p p e l l e e s ( " O w n e r s " ) . 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES 
RULES AND REGULATIONS PARTLY DETERMINATIVE 
25-1-15(2) 
25-1-13 
25-6-9(1) 
57-1-6 
57-3-2(1) 
78-22-1(1) 
Rule 1, URCP 
Rule 4, URCP 
UCA 1953 before amendment 
UCA 1953 before amendment 
UCA 1953 
UCA 1953 
UCA 1953 
UCA 1953 
Rule 10, 
Rule 17d, 
Rule 54b, 
Rule 56, 
Rule 58A, 
Rule 62, 
Rule 69, 
Rules 31,33 
URCP 
URCP 
URCP 
URCP 
URCP 
URCP 
URCP 
URAP 
QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
CASE NATURE, COURSE AND LOWER COURT DISPOSITION 
A c t i o n by P l a i n t i f f A p p e l l e e s ( "Owner s" ) t o p e r m a n e n t l y 
e n j o i n A p p e l l a n t s ( " J u d g m e n t C r e d i t o r s " ) f rom e x e c u t i n g and 
l e v y i n g upon p a r c e l s of r e a l e s t a t e t o s a t i s f y d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t s 
a g a i n s t c e r t a i n p s e u d o n y m o u s n a m e s and t w o i n d i v i d u a l s . 
The t r i a l c o u r t g r a n t e d Owners s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t . The 
Utah C o u r t of A p p e a l s a f f i r m e d t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n a Rule 31 
h e a r i n g a n d a l s o g r a n t e d A p p e l l e e s a t t o r n e y f e e s a n d d o u b l e 
c o s t s on a p p e a l . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
T h e r e a r e 3 s e p a r a t e J u d g m e n t C r e d i t o r s ( R o n e , G r e g g , 
B i e b e r ) who o b t a i n e d a t r i a l c o u r t c o n s o l i d a t i o n o r d e r f o r 
e x e c u t i o n p u r p o s e s o n l y . 
Rone s e r v e d o n e K e i t h V r e e k e n t o o b t a i n i n p e r s o n u m 
j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r c e r t a i n p s e u d o n y m o u s b u s i n e s s e s a n d t h e r e a l 
p a r t i e s b e h i n d t h e p s e u d o n y m s . [ R 1 6 5 3 - 1 6 6 2 , 1 7 0 9 - 1 7 1 9 ] D e -
f a u l t J u d g m e n t was g r a n t e d J u l y 2 6 , 1983 i n R o n e ' s f a v o r a g a i n s t 
5 p s e u d o n y m s . [ R 1 0 9 4 ] 
In s e p a r a t e l a w s u i t s , G r e g g and B i e b e r e a c h s e r v e d o n e 
K e i t h V r e e k e n a n d a l s o o n e C h r i s [ K r i s ] Vreeken a s i n d i v i d u a l s 
and a l s o t h e s a m e t w o p e r s o n s a s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of p s e u d o n y m s 
t o o b t a i n i n p e r s o n u m j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r c e r t a i n p s e u d o n y m o u s 
b u s i n e s s e s and t h e r e a l p a r t i e s b e h i n d t h e p s e u d o n y m s . [ R 1 6 5 3 -
1 6 6 2 , 1 7 0 9 - 1 7 1 9 ] D e f a u l t J u d g m e n t was g r a n t e d A u g u s t 2 5 , 1983 
by s e p a r a t e j u d g m e n t s i n G r e g g ' s and a l s o B i e b e r ' s f a v o r a g a i n s t 
STATEMENT OP THE CASE - NATURE AND COURSE 3 
Keith Vreeken and Chris [Kris] Vreeken individually and also 
aga ins t the same 5 pseudonyms Rone had gained judgment 
aga in s t . [R1723f 1667] 
Keith Vreeken had signed a Trust Deed on behalf of Red 
Deer Investment 6 days before he was served with the complaint 
in Rone's lawsui t and about a month before Keith and Chris 
[Kris] Vreeken were served the complaints in the Gregg and 
Bieber l awsu i t s . [R447-449] 
Owners had acquired record t i t l e t o 1 of the Alpine 
parce ls in 19 8 4 subsequent to Judgment Cred i to r s ' defaul t 
judgments from a record t i t l e holder labeled Red Deer 
Inves tments and Red Deer Inves tments , SA. [R314] Red Deer 
Inves tments and Red Deer Inves tments , SA were two of the 
pseudonymous bus iness names used by Judgment Debtors [R490, 
501-503] but were not any of the pseudonyms aga in s t whom Rone, 
Gregg and Bieber had obtained express default judgments. 
Rone a t tempted to pa r t i a l ly s a t i s fy h i s default judgment 
by con tes t ing garnishment p r i o r i t y to a bank account fund in 
Lehi, Utah. The p r i o r i t y quest ion was never reached, but r a the r 
the Utah Court of Appeals upheld the t r i a l cou r t ' s holding t h a t 
Keith Vreeken was not a proper par ty upon whom se rv ice could be 
made to acquire in personum ju r i sd i c t i on over the pseudonyms 
aga ins t whom Rone had obtained defaul t judgment. Demetropoulos 
v. Vreeken, 754 P2d 960 (Utah CA 1988) 
In t h e i r continued ef for t s t o s a t i s fy t h e i r default 
judgments, Judgment Credi tors executed upon 3 parce ls of r e a l 
STATEMENT OP THE CASE - PACTS RELEVANT 4 
e s t a t e i n Utah C o u n t y p u r s u a n t t o t h e s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y of 
2 5 - 1 - 1 5 ( 2 ) OCA 1953 t h e n a p p l i c a b l e . The r e a l e s t a t e h a d b e e n 
h e l d i n t h e p s e u d o n y m o i i s r e c o r d t i t l e of Red Dee r Inv e s t .n lei it 3 a t 
t h e t i m e J u d g m e n t C r e d i t o r s had b e e n g r a n t e d t h e i r d e f a u l t 
j u d g m e n t s . [ R 1 8 1 1 - 1 8 1 5 ] 
Owner s 1 leld r e c o r d t i t l e 1 , ; ' : . - . * - - * 
t i m e of e x e c u t i o n and b r o u g h t t h i s s u i t t o e n j o i n . Owners 
a l l e g e d no l i e n s of t h e J u d g m e n t C r e d i t o r s a t t a c h e d 10 t h e 2 
A1 pi 1: 1 e Da 1 e e l s d u e t o 1) i 1:1 v a l i d judgm e 1 11 s , 2 ) no "f i na 1 
j u d g m e n t s " , 3) no j u d g m e n t d e b t o r s 1 i n t e r e s t i n t h e r e a l e s t a t e , 
a n d 4) bona f i d e (good f a i t h ) p u r c h a s e r s t a t u s of O w n e r s . [ R l ] 
J u d g m e 1:11: C r e d i t o 1 s o 1: c > d u c e d R1 11 e 5 6 e v i d e n c e c r e a t i n g 
d i s p u t e d f a c t s r e g a r d i n g J u d g m e n t D e b t o r s t r u e i d e n t i t y a n d 
t h a t K e i t h V r e e k e n , C h r i s [ K r i s ] V r e e k e n and o t h e i fami 1 y 
m e m b e r s were u s i n g v a r i o u s p s e u d o n y m s a s c a m o f l a u g e , f i c t i -
t i o u s , and a s s u m e d n a m e s h a v i n g » s e p a r a t e l e g a l i d e n t i t y 
s t a t u s , . [ R 4 7 0 - 5 6 9 ] 
A f f i d a v i t e v i d e n c e and t r a n s c r i p t s of o t h e r US C o u r t 
p r o c e e d i n g s "* - f i l e d s h o w e d p s e u d o n y m o u s b u s i n e s s 
n a m e s ^ - ": I t j u d g m e n t s v e r e e n t e r e d in I avo i oi: 
J u d g m e n t C r e d i t o r s R o n e , G r e g g and B i e b e r w e r e a d o p t e d and u s e d 
t o hold p r o p e r t y and c o n d u c t b u s i n e s s by K e i t h V r e e k e n , C h r i s 
[ K r i s ] V r e e k e n and ofinej m e m b e r s oil t h e i r 1 m m • a: .- - l y . 
[ R 1 0 9 4 , 1 7 2 3 , ] 6 6 7 ; F i r s t F e d e r a l F i n a n c e 4 88, >09-515 ; 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l I n v e s t m e n t C o n f e r e n c e - 51535, 5 5 2 ; A r i e s + s e r v , 
SA - P5fr L 1 
STATEMENT 1 1I« Il"1 HI*, t A ,S H • FACTS RELEVANT 5 
Rule 56 evidence also showed Kris [Chr is] Vreeken as 
well as Keith Vreeken were served with process individual ly as 
well as as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s on behalf of pseudonyms aga ins t 
whom Judgment Credi tors Gregg and Bieber had obtained default 
judgments [R1653-1656, 1658-1663, 1657-1662, 1709-1710, 1712-
1715, 1718, 1711, 1719] and t h a t other family members named 
Fred and Kurt Vreeken made general appearances throuqh f i l ing an 
answer in the Rone case . [R1078] 
Officially recorded records of the Utah County Recorder 
were a lso submitted showing Keith Vreeken had in fac t signed a 
Trust Deed on behalf of the pseudonym Red Deer Inves tments as 
an off icer of said pseudonym under oath 6 days pr ior to being 
served process in the Rone case and about a month pr io r t o being 
served process in the Gregg and Bieber c a s e s . [R447-449] 
Owners moved for summary judgment which was granted. 
The t r i a l judge ruled the re were ques t ions regarding t i t l e to the 
property but no mate r i a l f a c t s le f t for dec is ion "par t icu lar ly in 
view of the Utah Court of Appeals aff i rmation of Judge Baliff 's 
rul ing in Demetropoulos v. Vreeken, 7 54 P.2d 96 0 (Utah [ s i c ] 
1988) Civil No. (CV86-2491), f inding improper se rv ice of 
p rocess . " [R624] 
The t r i a l judge held in h is Order grant ing summary 
judgment t h a t al l 3 separate default judgments "are inval id due 
to defec t s in se rv ice of process and do not in any event , 
c o n s t i t u t e f ina l judgment." [R627] 
Judgment Credi tors appealed to the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OP THE CASE - PACTS RELEVANT 6 
The case was sent to the Utah Court of Appeals who placed the 
case on the URAP Rule 31 calendar. On January 28, 1991, the 
Utah court of Apt--- affirmed the t r i a l < 's order without 
opinion and also granted appellees a reasonable a t torney fee and 
double cos t s on appeal under URAP Rule 3 3. 
POINT Is GREAT AND IMPORTANT ISSUES REGARDING IDENTITY 
AND NAMES NEED TO BE DECIDED FOR THE PEOPLE OF UTAH 
The law i s n o t s e t t l e d i n t h i s s t a t e c ! r* A rhe u n i v e r s a l 
p r i n c i p l e s t a t e d i n S t a t e v . T innen , 232 r D ^ J , O4O U e 
Coi lr t: ] 92 5) i s ax . I n t h a t c a s e o u r s u p r e m e c o u r t 
r e c o g n i z e d t h e u n i v e r s a l p r i n c i p l e of o u r 50 s t a t e s t h a t : 
T h e r e i s no q u e s t i o n i n l a w , e i t h e r [,] a s t o a 
c o n t r a c t e n t e r e d i n t o by a p e r s o n u n d e r an 
a s s u m e d o r f i c t i t i o u s n a m e b e i n g v a l i d . The 
law l o o k s t o t h e i d e n t i t y of t h e i n d i v i d u a l , and 
when t h i s i s e s t a b l i s h e d [ ,] t h e a c t i s b i n d i n g 
upon him and o t h e r s , , i r r e s p e c t i v e of t h e n a m e 
h e h a s a s s u m e d . 
T h i s p r i n c i p l e i s we l l s u b s t a n t i a t e d by c a s e law 
t h r o u g h o u t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . S e e V7 AJ2d Names S e c t i o n 6 2 . 
The q u e s t i oi :t i s i • l o e s " t h e l.-jvs l e i d e n t i t y 
of t h e i n d i v i d u a l ? " I s c l a i m a n t r e q u i r e d - i t i g a t e a l l 
q u e s t i o n s of p s e u d o n y m o u s u s e , a l t e r e g o s t a t u s , e t c . b e f o r e h e 
c a n e x e c u t e i I oon a n e x e c u t a b1 e i n t e r e s t ? 
Or i s s u p p l e m e n t a l p r o c e e d i n g s p e r t a i n i n g t o e x e c u t i o n s , 
g a r n i s h m e n t s a n d a t t a c h m e n t s a f t e r j u d g m e n t t h e p r o p e r forum t o 
d e t e r m i n e t h e s e i s S U P S " i .iint a f r a i d a s a b o d y of j u d i c i a r y a s a 
STAI'tilHKNT Il Iflii ( M.VIi FACTS RELEVANT 7 
whole, we are not familiar enough with the relationship of 
proceedings to obtain satisfaction of judgments as well as we 
are about how to obtain judgments. We must be careful in 
analyzing the balances which have developed through the ages to 
create a fair equilibrium between the injured and the 
perpetrator, the public and the individual, society and the 
government. 
Must parties and their adopted pseudonyms be judicially 
declared identical before rules of civil procedure are applied or 
can civil procedure rules be applied before such a determina-
tion? 
At what course in a judicial proceeding must the alter 
ego of pseudonymous business names be determined before 
execution will lie against property held in the names of the real 
parties and/or their pseudonyms? 
Can a judicial decision in one case declaring a certain 
individual ineligible to receive process on behalf of certain 
pseudonymous business names be used to declare different case 
judgments null and void when a personal judgment has been 
obtained against the same individual but the connection of 
another pseudonymous name to him has yet to be judicially 
declared? 
If parties 1. hold title to property and 2. transact 
business under pseudonymous names or labels, does it have to be 
judicially declared that the pseudonymous names or labels and 
the liable parties are one and the same before property held in 
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the pseudonymous name or names can be executed upon to sa t i s fy 
judgment l i ens? 
If judgment i s taken aga ins t one or more pseudonymous 
names or labels used by the l iable p a r t i e s , can execution be 
made on property held in the name of another pseudonymous name 
or labe l used by the l iab le p a r t i e s before obtaining a 
declara tory judgment t h a t the pseudonymous name under which 
the property executed upon i s held and the l iab le pa r t i e s are in 
fac t one and the same? 
If judgment has been taken aga ins t one or more 
pseudonymous names or labels used by the l iab le p a r t i e s , does 
t ha t mean execution can be made on property held in a l l 
pseudonymous names or labels used by the l iab le pa r t i e s ? 
In multiple par ty l i t i g a t i o n , does a jud ic ia l l ien and the 
r igh t to execute e x i s t in a judgment even though Rule 5 4b 
ce r t i f i c a t i on has not been secured? 
I s the quest ion of t rue i d e n t i t y a genuine mater ia l fac t 
precluding summary judgment? 
How does t rue i d e n t i t y bear upon pr inc ip les of serv ice 
of process j u r i sd i c t i on , judgment aga ins t a l l defendants , 
a t tachment of r ea l property jud ic ia l l i e n s , execution and sa le , 
bona fide purchaser , and res judica ta? 
The Utah Court of Appeals, however, re legated t h i s case 
to a Rule 31 d i spos i t i on which by the terms of t h a t rule of 
appelate procedure i t s e l f i s meant for "uncomplicated fac tual 
i s s u e s . . . based on uncomplicated i s s u e s of law. . . ," where 
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"the subs tan t ive ru les of law should be deemed se t t l ed , " whereas 
Rule 31 d i spos i t i on should not be had where the re are " i s sues of 
s ign i f i an t public i n t e r e s t , i s s u e s of law of f i r s t impress ion , or 
complicated i s s u e s of fac t or law." 
The Utah Court of Appeals has committed a monumental 
error by consciously or subconsciously blinding t h e i r minds to 
the very bas ic necessa ry i s s u e of i d e n t i t y de terminat ion in our 
cour ts of law and soc ie ty thus leaving t h i s s t a t e gropping in the 
dark regarding the s t a t u s of judgments, j ud i c i a l l i ens and the 
r i gh t to execute and levy upon, garn ish , and a t t ach in the State 
of Utah; the forum and procedure required to determine 
executable property i n t e r e s t s ; and the law's remedy and balance 
t o counter t h i s type of c l a s s i c abuse of pseudonymous names in 
the conduct of bus iness and the holding of t i t l e t o proper ty . 
Well has i t been pronounced: 
The use of f i c t i t i o u s names i s not t o be 
encouraged s ince i t lends i t s e l f too read i ly to 
fraud because of the concealment involved and 
i s l ike ly to be used aga ins t the public 
i n t e r e s t or a g a i n s t p r iva te i n t e r e 3 s t s , p a r t i -
cularly those of c red i to r s or o ther i n t e r e s t e d 
p a r t i e s . 65 CJS Names, Section 9(1) , note 27.5 
[Peak v. State, 163 NE2d. 584 (Indiana)] 
But when ce r t a in p a r t i e s t ake advantage of the public 
i n t e r e s t and p r iva te i n t e r e s t as in t h i s case and uni la te ra l ly 
concoct pseudonymous labels by which they buy and se l l r ea l and 
personal proper ty and do b u s i n e s s , as in t h i s c l a s s i c 
c i rcumstance here , the c i t i z e n s of t h i s s t a t e deserve and have 
an ina l ienable r i g h t t o have the law clear ly se t t l ed and s e t forth 
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for them. And the Utah Supreme Court needs to address t h i s 
i s s u e and most e ternal ly the people of the State of Utah deserve 
to know the clear law in t h i s r e spec t . 
The i s s u e s are squarely presented in t h i s fact s i t ua t ion 
and the case i s cer ta in ly r ipe for dec i s ion . Please en te r t a in 
your sacred extraordinary review power and l e t t hese i s s u e s on 
i d e n t i t y and pseudonym use be clearly se t t l ed in our s t a t e for 
the sake of every a t torney , every c i t i zen and every judge. 
POINT 2 : THE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES GREATLY NEED REVIEW 
Demetropoulous solely held t h a t Keith Vreeken was not a 
proper person on whom serv ice could be made to acquire in 
oersonum ju r i sd i c t i on over 5 pseudonymous bus iness names. I t 
did not say t ha t Chris [Kris] Vreeken was not a proper person on 
whom serv ice could be made. Also, in 2 of the 3 Judgment 
Debtor default judgments r the defendants Keith Vreeken and Chris 
[Kris] Vreeken had serv ice made upon them personal ly. They 
also had default judgments entered aga ins t them personally. 
Individuals as well as pseudonymous names are par t of the 
Judgment Debtors in the Gregg and Bieber c a s e s . 
In the Rone i n s t ance , newly discovered evidence has 
been uncovered showing Keith Vreeken signed a Trust Deed as an 
off icer of the pseudonym Red Deer Investments under oath 6 days 
p r io r to being served process in the Rone case . The Utah Court 
of Appeals s ta ted in one of i t s own cases t h a t a necessary 
element for a case to be res judicata to col la tera l ly es top the 
l i t i g a t i o n of the same i s s u e in another case i s a determinat ion 
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t h a t there was a full and fa i r l i t i g a t i o n of the quest ion in the 
pr ior case . Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, 7 50 
P2d 451 (Utah CA 1988). But they have apparent ly declined to 
follow t h e i r own law. A fac tua l quest ion was se t up in the Rule 
56 evidence showing a "full" and "complete" hear ing ques t ion . 
Is Rone en t i t l ed to rece ive t h a t hearing on the quest ion when 
new evidence i s uncovered? A very important quest ion needing 
dec i s ion in t h i s s t a t e . All are en t i t l ed to know in Utah in the 
future what i s and what i s not a full and fa i r hear ing for r e s 
judica ta purposes . This quest ion has not been dea l t with in our 
s t a t e . 
Demetropoulos has been taken much fa r the r than i t jus t ly 
can be taken. If the dec i s ion of the t r i a l court and the Court of 
Appeals i s allowed to s tand, i t e s sen t i a l l y depr ives Gregg and 
Bieber of t h e i r judgments aga ins t Keith and Chris [Kris] Vreeken 
as persons and t a k e s away poss ib le executable property i n t e r e s t s 
previously held by the pseudonym Red Deer Inves tments before 
the ques t ion of executable i n t e r e s t i s heard on the mer i ts 
before a jury and judge. That e s sen t i a l l y also depr ives Gregg 
and Bieber of t h e i r r i g h t to due p rocess . This i s s u e deserves t o 
be briefed before t h i s honorable court and a c l a r i f i ca t ion made 
regarding the breadth and scope of r e s judica ta as i t appl ies to 
a s i t u a t i o n l ike t h i s . Here one man served process i s declared 
an improper person to rece ive process on behalf of 5 
pseudonymous names but in the other cases the same man was 
served process personally as well as on behalf of the same 5 
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pseudonyms. 
This honorable court held in Carnes v. Carnes, 6 68 P2d 
555, 557 (Utah 1983) the re i s a presumption t h a t j u r i sd i c t ion i s 
proper un t i l rebut ted by clear and convincing evidence to the 
contrary. Carnes was jus t reaffirmed by you in Reed v. Reed, 
154 UAR 6 (Utah February 1991). But the Court of Appeals has 
ignored your se t t l ed law on t h i s poin t . 
Also, the Court of Appeals has ignored your recen t 
pronouncement on pre -ev idenc ia ry hearing ju r i sd ic t ion in Ander-
son v. American Society of Plastic & Reconstructive Surgeons, 
148 UAR 3, 4 (Utah November 15, 1990) You held there t h a t 
where ju r i sd ic t ion i s decided on a f f idav i t s and discovery alone, 
the process server i s only required to make a prima fac ie 
showing (presumption) of personal j u r i sd i c t ion and the se rve r ' s 
fac tua l a l lega t ions are accepted as t rue unless spec i f ica l ly 
controverted by a f f idav i t s or depos i t ions , but any d i spu tes in 
the documentary evidence are resolved in the s e rve r ' s favor. 
The t r i a l court must not weigh the evidence unless a hearing i s 
held. And if j u r i sd i c t i on tu rns on the same fac t s as the mer i t s 
[which i s the case in t h i s l a w s u i t ] , an ev ident ia ry hearing i s 
inappropr ia te p r io r t o t r i a l because i t inf r inges on the r iqh t to 
a jury t r i a l and i s an ine f f i c i en t use of jud ic ia l r e sources . In 
such c a s e s , j u r i sd i c t i on i s determined by t r i a l on the mer i t s . 
Par t icular ly in the Gregg and Bieber c a s e s , the quest ion 
of j u r i sd i c t i on cannot turn merely upon the holding in 
Demetroooulos. To l e t such a dec is ion s tand, denies due 
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process . The Court of Appeals has overstepped the normal 
course of j ud ic i a l proceedings in consider ing DemetroDOulos to 
resolve a l l the i s s u e s of j u r i s d i c t i o n . Extraordinary review i s 
fervent ly reques ted . 
POINT 3 : RULE 54b CONNECTION WITH JUDICIAL LIENS AND THE 
RIGHT TO EXECUTION NEEDS IMMEDIATE DECISION IN THIS STATE 
The t r i a l court held in i t s order t h a t in a l l 3 default 
judgments are inval id due to "defects in se rv ice of process and 
do not , in any event , cons t i t u t e f ina l judgment." If se rv ice of 
process requirements are not de te rmina t ive , then i t appears the 
t r i a l court and Owners' counsel fee l t he re i s some meaning in 
"f inal judgment" as sa id term i s used in Rule 54b. 
Great s t r e s s has been put on Rule 54b by Owners1 
counsel . Arguments have been made t h a t in multi par ty 
l i t i g a t i o n , no jud ic i a l l ien a t t a c h e s and no r i g h t s to execute 
accrue to a Judgment Creditor un t i l and unless a reques t has 
been made and a Rule 54b c e r t i f i c a t i o n obta ined. They have 
c i t ed federa l cases which they claim hold t h a t l i e n s and 
execut ion do not l i e unless the c e r t i f i c a t i o n called for in Rule 
54b has been obta ined. 
However, the l e g i s l a t i v e s t a t u t e in our s t a t e pe r ta in ing 
to judgment l i e n s s t a t e s judgment l i en s a t t ach a t the moment the 
judgment i s docketed. 78-22-1 OCA 1953 And our c i v i l rule of 
procedure Rule 62a i n d i c a t e s execut ion may i s s u e immediately 
upon ent ry of a judgment, which has been upheld in Taylor 
N a t i o n a l I n c . v . J e n s e n B r o s . C o n s t r u c t i o n C o . , 641 P2d 1 5 0 , 154 
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(Utah 19 82) by t h i s honorable h ighes t s t a t e court . 
Alsof in every dec is ion to date in t h i s s t a t e pe r ta in ing 
to Rule 54bf i t has been held said rule i s designed to avoid 
po ten t i a l i n jus t i ce caused by r ig id appl ica t ion of the t r a d i t i o n a l 
s ingle appeal of r igh t p r inc ip le . Marathon Steel Co.r 6 92 P2d 7 6 5, 
767 (Utah 198 4) i s an example from t h i s honorable court along 
with your most recen t pronouncement in Reed v. Reed, 15 4 UAR 6 
(February 19 91). 
So, do the federal inferences have any credence in our 
s t a t e ? If they do, i t has tremendous impact on a l l judgments 
throughout t h i s s t a t e . This i s a very c ruc ia l quest ion meri t ing 
immediate review and declara t ion from the h ighes t court in our 
s t a t e . We respectful ly implore your kind graces in doing so . 
POINT 4 : THE RELATIONSHIP OF RULES OF PROCEDURE WITH 
IDENTITY NEED CLARIFICATION 
Rules are designed to bring a pa t te rn of order and 
regu la r i ty to the cour t s . Drury v. Lunceford, 415 P2d 662 (Utah 
196 6) according to the h ighes t cour t ' s ed i c t . But they are 
always subserv ien t to subs tan t ive law promulgated by the 
soverign (who i s the people represented by i t s l e g i s l a t i v e 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s in our s t a t e ) . Rule l a says a t the beginning the 
ru les are to be l ibera l ly construed to bring the jus t 
de terminat ion of every ac t ion . Your honorable court has jus t 
reaffirmed your recogni t ion of t h i s purpose in Reed, supra. 
Many of the c i v i l ru les bear upon i d e n t i t y . They are 
wr i t ten in such a way t h a t they presume the i d e n t i t y of a person 
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or e n t i t y i s not in ques t ion . For example, Rule 4 on se rv ice of 
process procedure provides for modes of se rv ice on pa r tne r sh ip s , 
a s s o c i a t i o n s and corporat ions as well as on ind iv idua l s . I t i s 
presumed t h a t such e n t i t i e s are de jure legal e n t i t i e s . But what 
if a pseudonymous name appears on i t s face to be something i t 
in r e a l i t y i s not? 
Rule 54b presumes t h a t the t rue i d e n t i t y of a l l p a r t i e s 
i s undisputed. But in t h i s case , a prime example, i t was a race 
to the courts to beat a federa l agency from f i l ing a tax l i en . 
The federa l agency could ef fec t ive ly preempt other c r ed i to r s 
from p r io r i t y to execut ion on a s s e t s by merely recording a l i en . 
The i nves t i ga t i on and study necessary to determine the t rue 
nature of each pseudonym or to even come to a knowledge of each 
pseudonym was t remendous. I t was d i f f icu l t to do overnight or 
even within severa l yea r s . What should be the r e l a t i onsh ip to 
subs t an t ive law regarding l i a b i l i t y of the person for the th ings 
he does under pseudonyms? Should i t be required to determine 
i d e n t i t y r e l a t i onsh ip s before procedural rules are applied? If 
the presumptions of undisputed i d e n t i t y cannot be overcome, i s 
t he re j u s t i c e in the ru les? 
All t he se ques t ions are presented in t h i s ca se . They 
are impor tant and weighty ques t ions which need dec i s ion in our 
s t a t e . 
POINT 5: WE NEED A RULE OF LAW PREVENTING 
ABUSE OF PSEUDONYMS 
The ac t ions of the p r e c i p i t a t o r s of t h i s case in abusing 
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the use of pseudonyms to t h e i r advantage and the des t ruc t ion 
and confusion of the jud ic ia l system cannot be allowed. I t 
should never be allowed to happen in t h i s s t a t e again. The only 
way to prevent i t s occurrence i s to pronounce clearly from the 
h ighes t court of t h i s s t a t e the r i gh t s and r e l a t ionsh ips accruing 
from t rue i d e n t i t y . There has been no pronouncement from t h i s 
court regarding i d e n t i t y s ince 192 5 which clearly s e t s forth how 
we can "look to i den t i t y " of the person. This act ion br ings 
t he se i s s u e s to the court r ipe for dec i s ion . 
POINT 6: THE HIGHEST CODRT NEEDS TO REVIEW 
RULE 33 SANCTIONS 
The Court of Appeals has said a lo t about j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
for imposi t ion of Rule 3 3 sanc t ions , but t h i s honorable court has 
not . No decis ion on the point can be found from t h i s h ighes t 
court . The Court of Appeals does not seem to have given t h a t 
degree of cons idera t ion to t h i s case incumbent upon the high 
body which i t i s . This nonchalantness was manifested a t ora l 
hearing when ques t ions from the bench in t imated a lack of 
f ami l i a r i ty with the content of the p a r t i e s ' b r ie fs and the 
subconscious or conscious ac t ions of the chairman of the panel 
in saying one th ing regarding counsel for Judgment Credi tors 
r i gh t to reserve t ime for r ebu t t a l and then r e s t r i c t i n g him to a 
narrow quest ion of Rule 3 3 vulnerabi l i ty for 2 minutes a t the end 
of argument without an opportunity to cor rec t some misinforma-
t ion e l i c i t ed from opposing counsel . The ac t ion of the panel 
inferred a preconceived d i spos i t i on to the i s s u e s and an 
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ignorance of the conten t of wr i t ten argument. 
If the ques t ion of j u r i s d i c t i o n tu rns on the same fac t s 
as the mer i t s of the ca se , l i kewise , the appropr ia teness of the 
sanc t ions of Rule 3 3 tu rns on the same fac t s as the mer i t s . 
Judgment Credi tors have surely made a reasonably arguable 
a p p e a l . Brown v . Harry Heathman, Inc . , 7 44 P2d 1016 (Utah CA 
1987) Can the court of aopeals cont inue to a s s e r t i t s sanc t ions 
a t will as a d e t e r r e n t t o fur ther appeal without some firm 
guidance from the h i g h e s t cour t of our s t a t e ? Please make some 
precedent on Rule 33 sanc t ions a l so . 
CONCLUSION 
The cour t of appeals has l e f t us and t h i s s t a t e without 
any guidance and without any precedent s e t t l i n g the ques t ions of 
f i r s t impress ion and extreme public importance r a i s ed in t h i s 
c a s e . All of t he ques t i ons r a i s e d and every subs id ia ry ques t ion 
fa i r ly embraced within them are deserv ing of cons idera t ion a t 
t h i s t ime by t h i s honorable h ighes t court of the Sta te of Utah. 
Par t icu la r ly of c r i t i c a l importance i s a pronouncement 
on when t r u e i d e n t i t y needs to be jud ic ia l ly declared in t he 
course of l i t i g a t i o n . Please exe rc i s e your ex t raord inary review 
power and accept c e r t i o r a r i in t h i s c a se . J 
DATED t h i s ^ ^ f ^ / l d a y of K ^ f t M V A r 19 91. 
Respectfully submit ted , 
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APPENDIX 
2 5 - 1 - 1 5 ( 2 ) [OLD ACT] 
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES 
25-1-15. Rights of creditors with matured claims. Where a convey-
ance or obligation is fraudulent as to a creditor, such creditor, when his 
claim has matured, may, as against any person, except a purchaser for fair 
consideration without knowledge of the fraud at the time of the purchase 
or one who has derived title immediately or mediately from such a pur-
chaser: 
(1) have the conveyance set aside or obligation annulled to the extent 
jaeeeSsary to satisfy his claim; or, 
(2)y disregard the conveyance, and attach, or levy execution upon, the 
pfrjperty conveyed. 
A purchaser who without actual fraudulent intent has given less than 
a fair consideration for the conveyance or obligation may retain the prop-
erty or obligation as security for repayment. 
History: L. 1925, ch. 42, § 9; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 33-1-15. 
Defenses. 
Defendant in suit to set aside conveyance 
to his wife as fraudulent may interpose 
defense that property is exempt from execu-
tion, and does not exceed in value his maxi-
mum homestead, and upon submission of 
proof thereof by defendant, court will be 
required to make findings with respect 
thereto. Cardon v. Harper (1944) 106 U 560, 
151 P 2d 99, 154 ALR 906, following Williams 
v. Peterson (1935) 86 U 526, 46 P 2d 674. 
— evidence. 
Evidence in action to set aside conveyance 
by grantor of property of fair value of $3,250 
for $10 and other valuable consideration to 
daughters, held to show that conveyance was 
fraudulent as to creditors. Zuniga v. Evans 
(1935) 87 U 198, 48 P 2d 513, 101 ALR 532, 
distinguished in 102 U 12,126 P 2d 1063. 
Garnishment proceeding. 
Fact that pleadings in garnishment pro-
ceedings revealed that indebtedness sued 
upon was that of individuals and that those 
individuals had no account with garnishee 
bank, the only account being with corpora-
tion owned by individuals, did not make 
cause of action one, under this section, to set 
aside conveyance, and thus argument that 
court had never obtained jurisdiction of cor-
porate defendant or of res since no service of 
summons was made upon corporation could 
not be maintained; the pleading sufficiently 
averred a sham transaction between the indi-
viduals and the corporation so that they 
should be considered as identical for purpose 
of garnishment proceedings. Stine v. Girola 
(1959) 9 U 2d 22, 337 P 2d 62. 
Transfer of stock could be set aside as a 
fraudulent conveyance on motion in garnish-
ment proceeding, and it was not necessary to 
file a separate action to obtain such relief. 
Jensen v. Eames (1974) 30 U 2d 423, 519 P 2d 
236. 
Presumptions and burden of proof. 
Where grantees were in possession of 
premises pursuant to duly recorded deed and 
were paying taxes thereon, it was incumbent 
upon plaintiffs, in action to set aside convey-
ance, to allege and prove that grantees as 
such did certain acts which misled plaintiffs, 
or held themselves out in a way that misled 
plaintiffs and that plaintiffs had knowledge 
and relied thereon. Smith v. Edwards (1932) 
81 U 244,17 P 2d 264. 
Burden of proof is not on plaintiff to show 
that property, alleged to have been fraudu-
lently conveyed, is not exempt from execu-
tion. Cardon v. Harper (1944) 106 U 560, 151 
P 2d 99,154 ALR 906. 
Setting aside mortgage. 
A creditor with a matured claim may have 
a mortgage, a conveyance under 25-1-1, set 
aside under this section to the extent neces-
sary to satisfy his claim, where such convey-
ance was made without fair consideration, 
defined in 25-1-3, and would render the per-
son making it insolvent. Ned J. Bowman Co. 
v. White (1962) 13 U 2d 173, 369 P 2d 962. 
Collateral References. 
Fraudulent Conveyances <$=> 226 et seq. 
37 CJS Fraudulent Conveyances §306 et 
seq. 
37 AmJur 2d 827 et seq., Fraudulent Con-
veyances § 157 et seq. 
Admissibility of declarations of grantor or 
transferor on issue as to whether conveyance 
or transfer was in fraud of creditors, 83 ALR 
1446. 
Admissibility of subsequent declarations of 
vendor on issue whether sale was in fraud of 
creditors, 64 ALR 797. 
Assignability of executor's or administra-
tor's right to attack conveyance or transfer 
2 5 - 1 - 1 3 [OLD ACT] 
im 
25-1-13 FRAUD 
this chapter as against creditors and purchasers shall be equally void as 
against the heirs, successors, personal representatives or assigns of such 
creditors or purchasers. 
History: R.S. 1898 & OL. 1907, §2475; 
OL. 1917, § 5822; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 33-1-12. 
25-1-13. Bona fide purchasers not affected. The provisions of this 
chapter shall not be construed to affect or impair the title of a purchaser 
for a valuable consideration, unless it appears that such purchaser had pre-
vious notice of the fraudulent intent of his immediate grantor, or of the 
fraud rendering void the title of such grantor. 
History: R.S. 1898 & CJL 1907, §2476; 
OL. 1917, § 5823; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 33-1-13. 
Collateral References. 
Fraudulent Conveyances <£=> 192. 
37 CJS Fraudulent Conveyances § 282. 
37 Am JUT 2d 801, Fraudulent Conveyances 
§121. 
Necessity of participation by the grantee 
or transferee in the fraud of the grantor or 
transferor in order to avoid a voluntary con-
veyance or transfer as against creditors, 17 
ALR728. 
Presumption and burden of proof as 
regards good faith and consideration on part 
of purchaser or one taking encumbrance sub-
sequent to unrecorded conveyance or encum-
brance, 107 ALR 502. 
Right of grantee, mortgagee or transferee 
in instrument fraudulent as to creditors to 
protection to extent of consideration paid by 
him, 79 ALR 132. 
Right of grantee, or his privies, to main-
tain suit or proceeding for affirmative relief, 
where claim is made or anticipated that con-
veyance was made with intention on part of 
grantor, but without actual fraud by grantee, 
to defraud former's creditors, 128 ALR 1504. 
Right of grantee or transferee to be reim-
bursed for expenditures in payment of taxes 
or encumbrances on property where convey-
ance or transfer is in fraud of creditors, 8 
ALR 527. 
Rights as between creditors of fraudulent 
grantor, where one or more of them, in pay-
ment of or as security for his debt, receives 
deed or mortgage from fraudulent grantee, 
114 ALR 406. 
Rule la Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 1 
PART I. 
SCOPE OF RULES—ONE FORM OF 
ACTION. 
Rule 1. General provisions. 
(a) Scope of rules. These rules shall govern the 
procedure in the Supreme Court, the district courts, 
the circuit courts, and the justice courts of the state of 
Utah in all actions, suits, and proceedings of a civil 
nature, whether cognizable at law or in equity, and in 
all special statutory proceedings, except as governed 
by other rules promulgated by this court or enacted 
by the Legislature and except as stated in Rule 81 
Thev snail be liberally construed to secure the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every ac-
tion 
(b) Effective date. These rules shall take effect on 
January 1, 1950, and thereafter all laws in conflict 
therewith shall be of no further force or effect They 
govern all proceedings in actions brought after they 
take effect and also all further proceedings in actions 
then pending, except to the extent that in the opinion 
of the court their application in a particular action 
pending when the rules take effect would not be feasi-
ble or would work injustice, in which event the for-
mer procedure applies 
(Amended effective Jan 1, 1987 ) 
25-6-9 [PRESENT ACT] 
25-6-9. Good faith transfer. 
(1) A transfer or obligation is not voidable under Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a) 
against a person who took in good faith and for a reasonably equivalent value 
or against any subsequent transferee or obligee. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent a transfer is 
voidable in an action by a creditor under Subsection 25-6-8(l)(a), the creditor 
may recover judgment for the value of the asset transferred, as adjusted under 
Subsection (3), or the amount necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim, which-
ever is less. The judgment may be entered against: 
(a) the first transferee of the asset or the person for whose benefit the 
transfer was made; or 
(b) any subsequent transferee other than a good faith transferee who 
took for value or from any subsequent transferee. 
(3) If the judgment under Subsection (2) is based upon the value of the asset 
transferred, the judgment must be for an amount equal to the value of the 
asset at the time of the transfer, subject to an adjustment as equities may 
require. 
(4) Notwithstanding voidability of a transfer or an obligation under this 
chapter, a good-faith transferee or obligee is entitled, to the extent of the 
value given the debtor for the transfer or obligation, to: 
(a) a lien on or a right to retain any interest in the asset transferred; 
(b) enforcement of any obligation incurred; or 
(c) a reduction in the amount of the liability on the judgment. 
(5) A transfer is not voidable under Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b) or Section 
25-6-6 if the transfer results from: 
(a) termination of a lease upon default by the debtor when the termina-
tion is pursuant to the lease and applicable law; or 
(b) enforcement of a security interest in compliance with Chapter 9, 
Title 70A, the Uniform Commercial Code. 
(6) A transfer is not voidable under Subsection 25-6-6(2): 
(a) to the extent the insider gave new value to or for the benefit of the 
debtor after the transfer was made unless the new value was secured by a 
valid lien; 
(b) if made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the 
debtor and the insider; or 
(c) if made pursuant to a good-faith effort to rehabilitate the debtor and 
the transfer secured present value given for that purpose as well as an 
antecedent debt of the debtor. 
5 7 - 3 - 2 DCA 1953 
57-3-2. Record imparts notice — Change in interest rate — 
Validity of document — Notice of unnamed inter-
ests — Conveyance by grantee. 
(1) Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, in the manner 
prescribed by this title, each original document or certified copy of a document 
complying with Section 57-4a-3, whether or not acknowledged, each copy of a 
notice of location complying with Section 40-1-4, and each financing state-
ment complying with Section 70A-9-402, whether or not acknowledged shall, 
from the time of filing with the appropriate county recorder, impart notice to 
all persons of their contents. 
(2) If a recorded document was given as security, a change in the interest 
rate in accordance with the terms of an agreement pertaining to the underly-
ing secured obligation does not affect the notice or alter the priority of the 
document provided under Subsection (1). 
(3) This section does not affect the validity of a document with respect to 
the parties to the document and all other persons who have notice of the 
document. 
(4) The fact that a recorded document recites only a nominal consideration, 
names the grantee as trustee, or otherwise purports to be in trust without 
naming beneficiaries or stating the terms of the trust does not charge any 
third person with notice of any interest of the grantor or of the interest of any 
other person not named in the document. 
(5) The grantee in a recorded document may convey the interest granted to 
him free and clear of all claims not disclosed in the document in which he 
appears as grantee or in any other document recorded in accordance with this 
title that sets forth the names of the beneficiaries, specifies the interest 
claimed, and describes the real property subject to the interest. 
Historv: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2000; 
C.L. 1917, § 4900; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
78-3-2; L. 1977, ch. 272, § 54; 1985, ch. 159, 
5 7; 1988, ch. 155, § 14; 1989, ch. 88, § 8. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend-
ment designated the existing language as Sub-
section (1) and divided the formerly undivided 
language into two sentences, in Subsection (1), 
deleted "the provisions of before "Section 
70A-9-402" in the first sentence and made 
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CHAPTER 22 
JUDGMENT 
Section Section 
78-22-1. Lien of judgment. conclusive against sureties on 
78-22-1.1. Judgment against party dying after indemnity bond. 
verdict or decision. 78-22-3. Judgment by confession authorized. 
78-22-2. Judgment against sheriff — When 78-22-4. Mileage allowance for judgment 
debtor required to appear. 
78-22-1. Lien of judgment 
From the time the judgment of the district court or circuit court is docketed 
and filed in the office of the clerk of the district court of the county it becomes 
a lien upon all the real property of the judgment debtor, not exempt from 
execution, in the county in which the judgment is entered, owned by him at 
the time or by him thereafter acquired during the existence of said lien. A 
transcript of judgment rendered in a district court or circuit court of this state, 
in any county thereof, may be filed and docketed in the office of the clerk of 
the district court of any other county, and when so filed and docketed it shall 
have, for purposes of lien and enforcement, the same force and effect as a" 
judgment entered in the district court in such county. The lien shall continue 
for eight years unless the judgment is previously satisfied or unless the en-
forcement of the judgment is stayed on appeal by the execution of a sufficient 
undertaking as provided by law, in which case the lien of the judgment ceases. 
Rule 4 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 4. Process. 
(a) Signing of summons. The summons shall be 
signed and issued by the plaintiff or the plaintiffs 
attorney. Separate summonses may be signed and 
served. 
(b) Time of service. In an action commenced un-
der Rule 3(a)< 1), the summons together with a copy of 
the complaint shall be served no later than 120 days 
after the filing of the complaint unless the court al-
lows a longer period of time for good cause shown. If 
the summons and complaint are not timely served, 
the action shall be dismissed, without prejudice on 
application of any party or upon the court's own ini-
tiative. In any action brought against two or more 
defendants on which service has been obtained upon 
one of them within the 120 days or such longer period 
as may be allowed by the court, the other or others 
may be served or appear at any time prior to trial. 
(c) Contents of summons. The summons shall 
contain the name of the court, the address of the 
court, the names of the parties to the action, and the 
county in which it is brought. It shall be directed to 
the defendant, state the name, address and telephone 
number of the plaintiffs attorney, if any, and other-
wise the plaintiffs address and telephone number. It 
shall state the time within which the defendant is 
required to answer the complaint in writing, and 
shall notify the defendant that in case of failure to do 
so, judgment by default will be rendered against the 
defendant. It shall state either that the complaint is 
on file with the court or that the complaint will be 
filed with the court within ten days of service. If ser-
vice is made by publication, the summons shall 
briefly state the subject matter and the sum of money 
or other relief demanded, and that the complaint is on 
file. 
(d) By whom served. The summons and complaint 
may be served in this state or any other state or terri-
tory of the United States, by the sheriff or constable, 
or by the deputy of either, by a United States Mar-
shal or by the marshafs deputy, or by any other per-
son 18 years of age or older at the time of service, and 
not a partv to the action or a party's attorney. 
(e) Personal service. Personal service shall be 
made as follows: 
(1) Upon any individual other than one covered 
by subparagraphs (2), (3) or <4) below, by deliver-
ing a copy of the summons and'or the complaint 
to the individual personally, or by leaving a copy 
at the individual's dwelling house or usual place 
of abode with some person of suitable age and 
discretion there residing, or by delivering a copy 
of the summons and or the complaint to an agent 
authorized by appointment or by law to receive 
service of process: 
(2) Upon an infant (being a person under 14 
years) by delivering a copy to the infant and also 
to the infant's father, mother or guardian or, if 
none can be found within the state, then to any 
person having the care and control of the infant, 
or with whom the infant resides, or in whose ser-
vice the infant is employed; 
(3) Upon a natural person judicially declared to 
be of unsound mind or incapable of conducting 
his own affairs, by delivering a copy to the person 
and to the person's legal representative if one has 
been appointed and in the absence of such repre-
sentative, to the individual, if any, who has care, 
custody or control of the person; 
(4) Upon an individual incarcerated or commit-
ted at a facility operated by the state or any of its 
political subdivisions, by delivering a copy to the 
person who has the care, custody, or control of 
the individual to be served, or to that person's 
designee or to the guardian or conservator of the 
individual to be served if one has been appointed, 
who shall, in any case, promptly deliver the pro-
cess to the individual served; 
(5) Upon any corporation, not herein otherwise 
provided for, upon a partnership or other unin-
corporated association which is subject to suit un-
der a common name, by delivering a copy thereof 
to an officer, a managing or general agent, or 
other agent authorized by appointment or by law 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 4 
to receive service of process and, if the agent is 
one authorized by statute to receive service and 
the statute so requires, by also mailing a copy to 
the defendant If no such officer or agent can be 
found within the state, and the defendant has, or 
advertises or holds itself out as having, an office 
or place of business within the state or else-
where, or does business within this state or else-
where, then upon the person in charge of such 
office or place of business, 
(6) Upon an incorporated city or town, by deliv-
ering a copy thereof to the recorder; 
<7) Upon a county, by delivering a copy to the 
county clerk of such county; 
(8) Upon a school district or board of education, 
by delivering a copy to the superintendent or 
business administrator of the board; 
(9) Upon an irrigation or drainage district, by 
delivering a copy to the president or secretary of 
its board, 
(10) Upon the state of Utah, in such cases as by 
law are authorized to be brought against the 
state, by delivering a copy to the attorney gen-
eral and any other person or agency required by 
statute to be served, and 
(11) Upon a department or agency of the state 
of Utah, or upon any public board, commission or 
body, subject to suit, by delivering a copy to any 
member of its governing board, or to its executive 
employee or secretary 
if) Service and proof of service in a foreign 
country. Service in a foreign country shall be made 
as follows. 
(1) In the manner prescribed by the law of the 
foreign country for service in an action in any of 
its courts of general jurisdiction; or 
(2) Upon an individual, by personal delivery; 
and upon a corporation, partnership or associa-
tion, by delivering a copy to an officer or a man-
aging general agent, provided that such service 
be made by a person who is not a party to the 
action, not a party's attorney, and is not less than 
18 years of age, or who is designated by order of 
the court or by the foreign court; or 
(3) By any form of mail, requiring a signed 
receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the 
clerk of the court to the party to be served as 
ordered by the court. Proof of service in a foreign 
country shall be made as prescribed in these 
rules for service within this state, or by the law 
of the foreign country, or by order of the court. 
When service is made pursuant to subpart (3) of 
this subdivision, proof of service shall include a 
receipt signed by the addressee or other evidence 
of delivery to the addressee satisfactory to the 
court 
(g) Other service. Where the identity or where-
abouts of the person to be served are unknown and 
cannot be ascertained through reasonable diligence, 
where service upon all of the individual parties is 
impracticable under the circumstances, or where 
there exists good cause to believe that the person to 
be served is avoiding service of process, the party 
seeking service of process may file a motion sup-
ported by affidavit requesting an order allowing ser-
vice by publication, by mail, or by some other means. 
The supporting affidavit shall set forth the efforts 
made to identify, locate or serve the party to be 
served, or the circumstances which make it impracti-
cable to serve all of the individual parties If the mo-
tion is granted, the court shall order service of process 
by publication, by mail from the clerk of the court, by 
other means, or by some combination of the above, 
provided that the means of notice employed shall be 
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to 
apprise the interested parties of the pendency of the 
action to the extent reasonably possible or practica-
ble The court's order shall also specify the content of 
the process to be served and the event or events as of 
which service shall be deemed complete A copy of the 
court's order shall be served upon the defendant with 
the process specified by the court 
(h) Manner of proof. In a case commenced under 
Rule 3(a)(1), the party serving the process shall file 
proof of service with the court promptly, and in any 
event within the time during which the person served 
must respond to the process, and proof of service must 
be made within ten days after such service Failure to 
file proof of service does not affect the validity of the 
service In all cases commenced under Rule 3(a)(1) or 
Rule 3(a)(2), the proof of service shall be made as 
follows: 
(1) If served by a sheriff, constable, United 
States Marshal, or the deputy of any of them, by 
certificate with a statement as to the date, place, 
and manner of service. 
(2) If served by any other person, by affidavit 
with a statement as to the date, place, and man-
ner of service, together with the affiant's age at 
the time of service; 
(3) If served by publication, by the affidavit of 
the publisher or printer or that person's desig-
nated agent, showing publication, and specifying 
the date of the first and last publications; and an 
affidavit by the clerk of the court of a deposit of a 
copy of the summons and complaint in the 
United States mail, if such mailing shall be re-
quired under this rule or by court order; 
(4) If served by United States mail, by the affi-
davit of the clerk of the court showing a deposit 
of a copy of the summons and complaint in the 
United States mail, as may be ordered by the 
court, together with any proof of receipt; 
(5) By the written admission or waiver of ser-
vice by the person to be served, duly acknowl-
edged, or otherwise proved. 
(i) Amendment At any time in its discretion and 
upon such terms as it deems just, the court may allow 
any process or proof of service thereof to be amended, 
unless it clearly appears that material prejudice 
would result to the substantial rights of the party 
against whom the process issued. 
(j) Refusal of copy. If the person to be served re-
fuses to accept a copy of the process, service shall be 
sufficient if the person serving the same shall state 
the name of the process and offer to deliver a copy 
thereof. 
(k) Date of service to be endorsed on copy At the 
time of service, the person making such service shall 
endorse upon the copy of the summons left for the 
person being served, the date upon which the same 
was served, and shall sign his or her name thereto, 
and, if an officer, add his or her official title. 
(1) Designation of newspaper for publication of 
notice. In any proceeding where summons or other 
notice is required to be published, the court shall, 
upon the request of the party applying for such publi-
cation, designate the newspaper and authorize and 
direct that such publication shall be made therein; 
provided, that the newspaper selected shall be a 
newspaper of general circulation in the county where 
such publication is required to be made and shall be 
published in the English language 
(Amended effective March 1, 1988, April 1, 1990 ) 
Rule 10 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 10. Form of pleadings. 
(a) Caption; names of parties. Every pleading shall contain a caption 
setting forth the name of the court, the title of the action, the file number, and 
a designation as in Rule 7(a). In the complaint the title of the action shall 
include the names of all the parties, but in other pleadings it is sufficient to 
state the name of the first party on each side with an appropriate indication of 
other parties. A party whose name is not known shall be designated by any 
name and the words "whose true name is unknown." In an action in rem 
unknown parties shall be designated as "all unknown persons who claim any 
interest in the subject-matter of this action." 
(b) Paragraphs; separate statements. All averments of claim or defense 
shall be made in numbered paragraphs, the contents of each of which shall be 
limited as far as practicable to a statement of a single set of circumstances; 
and a paragraph may be referred to by number in all succeeding pleadings. 
Each claim founded upon a separate transaction or occurrence and each de-
fense other than denials shall be stated in a separate count or defense when-
ever a separation facilitates the clear presentation of the matters set forth. 
(c) Adoption by reference; exhibits. Statements in a pleading may be 
adopted by reference in a different part of the same pleading or in another 
pleading, or in any motion. An exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all 
purposes. 
(d) Paper used for pleadings; size and style. All pleadings and other 
papers filed in any action, except printed documents or other similar exhibits, 
shall be typewritten on good, white, unglazed paper of letter size (8V2" x 11"), 
with a margin at the top of each page of not less than 2 inches and a left hand 
Rule 17 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 17 
nonresident infant defendant shall have 20 days after his appointment in 
which to plead to the action. 
(4) When an insane or incompetent person is a party to an action or 
proceeding, upon the application of a relative or friend of such insane or 
incompetent person, or of any other party to the action or proceeding. 
(d) Associates may be sued by common name. When two or more per-
sons associated in any business either as a joint-stock company, a partnership 
or other association, not a corporation, transact such business under a com-
mon name, whether it comprises the names of such associates or not, they 
may be sued by such common name; and any judgment obtained against the 
defendant in such case shall bind the joint property of all the associates in the 
same manner as if all had been named defendants and had been sued upon 
their joint liability. 
(e) Action against a nonresident doing business in this state. When a 
nonresident person is associated in and conducts business within the state of 
Utah in one or more places in his own name or a common trade name, and 
said business is conducted under the supervision of a manager, superinten-
dent, or agent, said person may be sued in his own name in any action arising 
out of the conduct of said business. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 17, F.R.C.P. 
ANALYSIS 
Associates. 
—Joint venture. 
—Partnership. 
—Unincorporated association. 
Infants. 
—Action for injury of minor. 
Suit by mother. 
—Control by court. 
—Failure to comply. 
Relief from judgment. 
Nonresident doing business in state. 
—Not found. 
Real party in interest. 
—Assignee. 
—Corporation. 
Assignment of assets to another corpora-
tion. 
Foreign corporation. 
Shareholder. 
—Insurance company. 
—Joint tort-feasors. 
—Partner in joint venture. 
—Purpose of rule. 
—Wife. 
Cited 
Associates. 
—Joint venture. 
Joint venturers may sue in the name of the 
Cross-References. — Guardians, § 75-5-
101 et seq. 
Service of process, Rule 4. 
joint venture. Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 95 
Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (1988). 
—Partnership. 
Subdivision (d) does not affirmatively allow 
a partnership to bring suit in its common 
name, but the absence of a provision specifi-
cally authorizing a lawsuit in the partnership 
name is not indicative of an intent to prohibit 
such a suit. Gary Energy Corp. v. Metro Oil 
Prods., 114 F.R.D. 69 (D. Utah 1987). 
—Unincorporated association. 
Subdivision (d) does not authorize an unin-
corporated association to institute an action in 
its common name. Disabled Am. Veterans v. 
Hendrixson, 9 Utah 2d 152, 340 P.2d 416 
(1959). 
Infants. 
—Action for injury of minor. 
Suit by mother. 
Under this rule, mother as guardian ad litem 
for benefit of father could bring action for inju-
ries to sixteen-year-old son where father, an 
immigrant, had a somewhat limited use of En-
glish and business matters were mainly han-
dled by the mother; § 78-11-6 providing for 
suit by father was not exclusive remedy. 
Skollmgsberg v. Brookover, 26 Utah 2d 45, 484 
P.2d 1177 (1971). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Rule 54b Utah 
PART VTI. 
JUDGMENT. 
Rule 54. Judgments; costs. 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these 
rules includes a decree and any order from which an 
appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a recital of 
pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of 
prior proceedings. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or in-
volving multiple parties. When more than one 
claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party 
claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved, the 
court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to 
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties 
only upon an express determination by the court that 
there is no just reason for delay and upon an express 
direction for the entry of judgment In the absence of 
such determination and direction, any order or other 
form of decision, however designated, which adjudi-
cates fewer than all the claims or the rights and lia-
bilities of fewer than all the parties shall not termi-
nate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and 
the order or other form of decision is subject to revi-
sion at any time before the entry of judgment adjudi-
cating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of 
all the parties. 
(c) Demand for judgment 
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against 
whom a judgment is entered by default, every 
final judgment shall grant the relief to which the 
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, 
even if the party has not demanded such relief in 
his pleadings. It may be given for or against one 
or more of several claimants; and it may, when 
the justice of the case requires it, determine the 
ultimate rights of the parties on each side as be-
tween or among themselves. 
(2) Judgment by default A judgment by de-
fault shall not be different in kind from, or ex-
ceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in 
the demand for judgment 
(d) Costs, 
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express 
provision therefor is made either in a statute of 
this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed 
of Civil Procedure 
as of course to the prevailing party unless the 
court otherwise directs; provided, however, 
where an appeal or other proceeding for review is 
taken, costs of the action, other than costs in con-
nection with such appeal or other proceeding for 
review, shall abide the final determination of the 
cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers 
and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent 
permitted by law. 
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his 
costs must within five days after the entry of 
judgment serve upon the adverse party against 
whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memoran-
dum of the items of his costs and necessary dis-
bursements in the action, and file with the court 
a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating 
that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct, 
and that the disbursements have been necessar-
ily incurred in the action or proceeding. A party 
dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within 
Beven days after service of the memorandum of 
costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed 
by the court in which the judgment was ren-
dered. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after 
the verdict, or at the time of or subsequent to the 
service and filing of the findings of fact and con-
clusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, 
shall nevertheless be considered as served and 
filed on the date judgment is entered. 
(3), (4) [Deleted.1 
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the 
judgment The clerk must include in any judgment 
signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision 
from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the 
same have been taxed or ascertained. The clerk must, 
within two days after the costs have been taxed or 
ascertained, in any case where not included in the 
judgment, insert the amount thereof in a blank left in 
the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar 
notation thereof in the register of actions and in the 
judgment docket 
(Amended effective January 1, 1985). 
Rule 56 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant A party seeking to recover upon 
a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a 
declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expi-
ration of 20 days from the commencement of the ac-
tion or after service of a motion for summary judg-
ment by the adverse party, move with or without sup-
porting affidavits for a summary judgment in his fa-
vor upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a 
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a 
declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a sum-
mary judgment in his favor as to all or any part 
thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The mo-
tion shall be served at least 10 days before the time 
fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the 
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine 
issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on 
motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon 
the whole case or for all the relief aaked and a trial is 
necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by 
examining the pleadings and the evidence before it 
and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable as-
certain what material facts exist without substantial 
controversy and what material facta are actually and 
in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make 
an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which 
the amount of damages or other relief is not in contro-
versy, and directing Buch further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the 
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the 
trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; de-
fense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits 
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth 
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and 
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent 
to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or cer-
tified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to 
in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served 
therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be sup-
plemented or opposed by depositions, answers to in-
terrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for 
summary judgment is made and supported as pro-
vided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon 
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but 
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in 
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be 
entered against him. 
(0 When affidavits are unavailable. Should it 
appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the 
motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the 
court may refuse the application for judgment or may 
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be ob-
tained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be 
had or may make such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it ap-
pear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that 
any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of 
delay, the court shall forthwith order the party em-
ploying them to pay to the other party the amount of 
the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affida-
vits caused him to incur, including reasonable attor-
ney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may 
be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Rule 31 Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Rule 31. Expedited appeals decided after oral 
argument without written opinion. 
;a) Motion and stipulation for expedited hear-
ing. Aftrr \h\: filing of all briefs in an appeal, a party 
may move for an expedited decision without a written 
opinion. The motion shall be in the form prescribed 
by Rule 23 and shail describe the nature of the case, 
the issues presented and any special reasons the par-
ties may have for an expedited decision. The court 
may disposs of any qualified case under this rule 
upon its own motion. 
ib) Cases which qualify for expedited decision. 
Appeals involving uncomplicated factual issues based 
primarily on documents, summary judgments, dis-
missals for failure to state a claim, dismissals for lack 
of personal or subject matter jurisdiction, and judg-
ments or orders based on uncomplicated issues of law 
are, in general, of a type which the court will consider 
on a motion for expedited decision. In all motions 
brought under this rule, the substantive rules of law 
should be deemed settled, although the parties may 
differ as to their application. 
ic) Appeals ineligible for expedited decision. 
The court will not grant a motion for an expedited 
appeal in cases raising substantial constitutional is-
sues, issues of significant public interest, issues of 
law of first impression, or complicated issues of fact or 
law. 
•d; Procedure if expedited motion is granted. If 
a motion for expedited decision is granted, the appeal 
will be given an expedited setting for oral argument 
within 45 to GO days from the date of the order grant-
ing the motion. Within two days after submission of 
the appeal, the court will conference, decide the case, 
and issue a written order which.need not be accompa-
nied by an opinion. Entry of the order by the cierk in 
the records of the court, shall constitute the entry of 
the judgment of the court. 
(e) Precedential effect. Appeals decided under 
this rule will not stand as precedent, but, in other 
respects, will have the same force and effect as other 
decisions of the court. 
(0 Issuance of written opinion. If it appears to 
the court after the case has been submitted for deci-
sion that a written opinion should be issued, the time 
limitation in paragraph (d) shall not apply and the 
parties will be so notified. 
Rule 33 Utah Rules of Aroellate Procedure 
Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; 
recovery of attorney's fees. 
'a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Ex-
cept in a first appeal of right in a criminal case, if the 
court determines that a motion made or appeal taken 
under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it 
shall award just damages, which may include single 
or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and or reason-
able attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court 
may order that the damages be paid by the party ur 
by the party's attorney. 
(bi Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a 
frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is one 
that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by exist-
ing law, or not based on a good faith argument to 
extend, modify, or reverse existing law. An appeal, 
motion, brief, or other paper interposed fir the pur-
pose of delay is one interposed for any improper pur-
pose such as to harass, cause needless increase in the 
cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit only 
the party filing the appeal, motion. Hrief, or other 
paper. 
(c) Procedures. 
(1) The court may award damages upon re-
quest of any party or upon its own motion. A 
party may request damages under this ruie only 
as part of the appellee's motion for summary dis-
position under Rule 10, as part of the appellee's 
brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion 
or other paper. 
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion 
of the court, the court shall issue to the party or 
the party's attorney or both an order to show 
cause why such damages should not be awarded. 
The order to show cause shall set forth the alle-
gations which form the basis of the damages and 
permit at least ten days in which to respond un-
less otherwise ordered for good cause shown. The 
order to show cause may be part of the notice of 
oral argument. 
(3) If requested by a party against whom dam-
ages may be awarded, the court shall grant a 
hearing. 
Rule 58A. Utah R u l e s of C i v i l Procedure 
Rule 58A. Entry. 
(a) Judgment upon the verdict of a jury. Unless the court otherwise 
directs and subject to the provisions of Rule 54(b), judgment upon the verdict 
of a jury shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed. If there is a special 
verdict or a general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories re-
turned by a jury pursuant to Rule 49, the court shall direct the appropriate 
judgment which shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed. 
(b) Judgment in other cases. Except as provided in Subdivision (a) hereof 
and Subdivision (b)(1) of Rule 55, all judgments shall be signed by the judge 
and filed with the clerk. 
(c) When judgment entered; notation in register of actions and judg-
ment docket. A judgment is complete and shall be deemed entered for all 
purposes, except the creation of a lien on real property, when the same is 
signed and filed as herein above provided. The clerk shall immediately make 
a notation of the judgment in the register of actions and the judgment docket. 
(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment The prevailing party shall 
promptly give notice of the signing or entry of judgment to all other parties 
and shall file proof of service of such notice with the clerk of the court. How-
ever, the time for filing a notice of appeal is not affected by the notice require-
ment of this provision. 
(e) Judgment after death of a party. If a party dies after a verdict or 
decision upon any issue of fact and before judgment, judgment may neverthe-
less be rendered thereon. 
(f) Judgment by confession. Whenever a judgment by confession is au-
thorized by statute, the party seeking the same must file with the clerk of the 
court in which the judgment is to be entered a statement, verified by the 
defendant, to the following effect: 
(1) If the judgment to be confessed is for money due or to become due, it 
shall concisely state the claim and that the sum confessed therefor is 
justly due or to become due; 
(2) If the judgment to be confessed is for the purpose of securing the 
plaintiff against a contingent liability, it must state concisely the claim 
and that the sum confessed therefor does not exceed the same; 
(3) It must authorize the entry of judgment for a specified sum. 
The clerk shall thereupon endorse upon the statement, and enter in the 
judgment docket, a judgment of the court for the amount confessed, with costs 
of entry, if any. 
(Amended, effective Sept. 4, 1985 and Jan. 1, 1987.) 
RULINGS AND ORDERS 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
********* 
LON S. NIELD, et al. , 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DAVID R. BATEMAN in his 
capacity as Sheriff of 
Utah County, Utah; et al., 
Defendants. 
RULING 
CV87-2319 
JUDGE BOYD L. PARK 
********* 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly before the 
Court on Plaintiffs', Lon S. Nield, Patricia L. Nield, November 
Investors, Mark Peterson, and Nancy L. Peterson's, Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The Court, having read the Motion, and 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of and in 
Opposition to the Motion, now makes the following findings and 
ruling: 
FINDINGS 
1. Plaintiffs, Lon S. Nield, Patricia L. Nield, November 
Investors, Mark Peterson, and Nancy L. Peterson Motioned the 
Court for Summary Judgment as against Defendants, B. J. Rone, 
Ronald A. Bieber, RAB Ranch, and James A. Gregg, on Counts I, II, 
III, and IV of Plaintiffs' Complaint and against Sheriff Bateman, 
solely as to Count II of the Complaint. 
2. This Court having spent an inordinate amount of time 
reviewing and analyzing several cases of the Fourth District 
Court, to wit: Case No's. 63,505, 63,522, 63,923 and 64,055,as 
requested by Plaintiffs1 counsel, and further having researched 
and evaluated numerous statutes, title reports, Affidavits, Court 
transcripts, Deeds, and cases cited in the parties respective 
Memorandums, finds that even though some factual questions still 
exist (particularly regarding chain of title), the Court does not 
believe these to be material issues of fact particularly in view 
of the Utah Court of Appeals affirmation of Judge Balifffs ruling 
in Demetropoulos v. Vreeken, 754 P.2d 960 (Utah 1988) Civil No. 
(CV86-2491), finding improper service of process. 
RULING 
1. Plaintiffs, Lon S. Nield, Patricia L. Nield, November 
Investors, Mark Peterson, and Nancy L. Peterson's, Motion for 
Summary Judgment is granted. 
DATED this £/ day of August, 1989. 
•OYD'L. PAftK, DISTRICT JUDGE 
cc: Michael M. Later, Esq. 
George M. McCune, Esq. 
Guy R. Burningham, Esq, 
Bruce A. Maak, Of Counsel (A2033) 
Michael M. Later (A3728) 
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
Dennis Norton (A2425) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LON S. NIELD, et ah, ] 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. ; 
DAVID R. BATEMAN in his 
capacity as Sheriff of 
Utah County, Utah; et al., 
Defendants. ] 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. CV87-2319 
1 (Judge Boyd L. Park) 
Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment came before the 
Court for hearing on Friday, January 13, 1989. Plaintiffs sought 
to have this Court declare that certain judgments held by defen-
dants did not constitute liens against plaintiffs' homes and to 
enjoin defendants from attempting to foreclose upon plaintiffs' 
homes. The Court's ruling with respect to Counts I and II of 
plaintiffs' Complaint resolves all issues regarding the existence 
of any lien in favor of the defendants against plaintiffs7 homes, 
there exists no good reason for delay in entry of this ruling as 
a final judgment and, therefore, pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court hereby enters judgment as 
follows with respect to Counts I and II of plaintiffs' Complaint: 
The default judgment in favor of B. J. Rone in the case 
of B. J. Rone v. Kurt Vreeken. et al.. Civil No. 63,522, in the 
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, State of Utah; the 
default judgment in favor of Ronald A. Bieber in the case of Ronald 
A. Bieber dba RAB Ranch v. Kurt Vreeken, et al.. Civil No. 64,055, 
in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, State of 
Utah; and the default judgment in favor of James A. Gregg in the 
case of James A. Gregg v. Kurt Vreeken, et al. Civil No. 63,923, 
in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, State of 
Utah, are invalid due to defects in service of process and do not, 
in any event, constitute final judgment. The above-listed default 
judgments in favor of B.J. Rone, Ronald A. Bieber, and James A. 
Gregg do not constitute liens against the home of Lon S. and 
Patricia L. Nield including the following described parcel of real 
property in Utah County, Utah: 
Lot 1, Plat A, Shadow Mountain Estates, 
Utah County, Utah according to the offi-
cial plat thereof in the office of the 
Utah County Recorder, less and excepting 
-2-
(fat-n044.kjp5) 
the following tract: Commencing at the 
Southeast corner of Lot 12, Plat A, Shadow 
Mountain Estates Subdivision, Alpine; 
thence North 11°27'56" East 325.12 feet; 
thence South 9°34'18" West 323.13 feet; 
thence West 10.90 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
The above-listed default judgments in favor of B.J. Rone, Ronald 
A. Bieber, and James A. Gregg do not constitute liens against the 
home of Mark and Nancy L. Peterson, including the following 
described parcel of real property located in Utah County, Utah: 
Lot 12, Plat A, Shadow Mountain Estates 
Subdivision, Alpine, Utah, according to 
the official plat thereof on file and of 
record in the Utah County Recorder's 
office. 
Defendants are hereby permanently enjoined from conducting any 
sheriff's sale, foreclosure, or other form of execution against the 
Nield and Peterson homes pursuant to the above-referenced default 
judgments in favor of B.J. Rone, Ronald A. Bieber, and James A. 
Gregg. 
DATED this >< <^ day of October, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
• ^ _.-JL..sr-f, sy /*., ,//-«• c 
BOYD L. PARK 
District Judge 
(fat-n044.kjp5) 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS 
Lchael M. Latef" Mi
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
George L. McCune 
Attorney for Defendant Rone, 
Bieber, RAB Ranch and Gregg 
Guy R. Burningham 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorney for David R. Bateman 
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FILED 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
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Mary T. Noonan 
Clerk of tho Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Lon S. Nield, Patricia L. 
Nield, November Investors, a 
Utah limited partnership; and 
V. Mark Peterson and Nancy L. 
Peterson, as general partners 
of and on behalf of November 
Investors, 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
v. 
David R. Bateman, in his 
capacity as Sheriff of Utah 
County, Utah, and B. J. Rone; 
Ronald A. Bieber; RAB Ranch, a 
business entity; and James A. 
Gregg. 
Defendants and Appellants, 
B. J. Rone, James A. Gregg, and 
Ronald A. Bieber, 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Associated Title Company, a 
Utah corporation; Briant 
Stafford, an individual; Stormy 
Peterson, an individual; Wendy 
Wilson, an individual; Diane C. 
Green, an individual; D. & M. 
Coal Company, a South Carolina 
corporation; and other John 
Does and Jane Does, whose true 
names are unknown at present, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE 
Case No. 900187-CA 
Before Judges Orme, Garff, and Bench (on Rule 31 Hearing). 
The summary judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 
Under Utah R. App. P. 33(a), we award appellees a reasonable 
attorney fee and double costs on appeal. 
This case is remanded to the trial court to determine the 
amount of costs and fees awarded to appellees and whether said 
award should be assessed against appellants, appellants1 
attorney, or each of them. See Tavlor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 
P.2d 163, 172 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
DATED this £f day of January, 1991. 
ALL CONCUR: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 28rd day of January, 1991, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was hand-delivered or 
deposited in the United States mail. 
George M. McCune 
Attorney at Law 
Suite 17 Intrade Complex 
1399 South 700 East 
Box 520561 
Salt Lake City, UT 84152-0561 
Michael M. Later 
Bruce A. Maak 
Larsen, Kimball, Parr & Crockett 
Attorneys at Law 
185 South State, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
DATED this 28rd day of January, 1991. 
By ^  c'Ciuti- > ) Sc f 
Deputy Clerk/ 
George M. McCune (2171) 
Attorney for Defendants and 
Appellants Bieber, RAB Ranch, 
Gregg, and Rone 
524 3 Carpell Avenue 
Box 18044 
Salt Lake Cityr UT 84118-8044 
Tel. 801-964-2825 
FAX 801-964-0551 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
-oOo-
LON S. NIELD; PATRICIA L. 
NIELD; NOVEMBER INVESTORS, a 
Utah limited partnership; and 
V. MARK PETERSON and NANCY L. 
PETERSON, as general partners 
of and on behalf of November 
Investors, 
Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
vs. 
DAVID R. BATEMAN in his 
capactiy as Sheriff of Utah 
County, Utah; B. J. RONE; 
RONALD A. BIEBER; RAB RANCH, a 
business entity; and JAMES A. 
GREGG, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
B. J. RONE, JAMES A. GREGG, 
and RONALD A. BIEBER, 
Third Party 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ASSOCIATED TITLE COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation; BRIANT 
Case No. 
ORDER EXTENDING 
TIME FOR FILING 
PETITION FOR 
WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
ORDER EXTENDING TIME TO FILE PETITION FOR WRIT 
STAFFORD, an individual; 
STORMY PETERSON, an individual; 
WENDY WILSON, an individual; 
DIANE C. GREEN, an individual; 
D. £ M. COAL COMPANY, a South 
Carolina corporation; and other 
JOHN DOES and JANE DOES, whose 
true names are unknown at pre-
sent, 
Third Party 
Defendants• 
Appellants having filed a motion pursuant to Rule 48(e) Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, as amended, for exbention of time to file a petition far writ of 
certiorari in this matter and good cause appearinq therefor, 
IT IS ORDERED that the time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in this 
matter i s extended from February 27, 1991 to Friday, March 29, 1991. 
DATED this ^~~~" daY °f y*;l^l*agfr , 1991: 
BY THE COURT: 
Justice of the Supreme Court 
ORDER EXTENDING TIME TO PILE PETITION POR WRIT 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing pleading to the followingr each in a 
securely sealed envelope, deposited in the United States mail on this 
^ Q v ^ a y of ^ , ^ H W W , 1991: 
r) 
Michael M. Later/Bruce A. Maak 
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS 
Suite 1300, 185 S. State 
Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147 
A. Dennis Norton 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Guy R. Burningham 
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
Utah County Courthouse 
Provo, UT 84601 
Clerk 
Utah Court of ADDeals 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Clerk 
Utah County 
Utah County Courthouse 
Provo, UT 84601 
ORDER EXTENDING TIME TO FILE PETITION POR WRIT 3 
COURT OPINIONS 
Anderson v . American Soc i e ty of P l a s t i c & Reconstruct ive 
S u r g e o n s , 148 UAR 3 , 4 (Utah November 1 5 f 1990) 
COOE«CO Anderson v. American S 
PTOVO. Lui» 148 Utah 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Celia ANDERSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF PLASTIC AND 
RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGEONS, Dr. 
Robert Goldwyn, Broadbent & Woolf, Inc., a 
Utah corporation, Robert M. Woolf, 
individually, and Dow Corning Corporation, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 870421 
FILED: November 15, 1990 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
Honorable Leonard Russon 
ATTORNEYS: 
Daniel F. Bench, Robert J. DeBry, Salt Lake 
City, for Celia Anderson 
P. Keith Nelson, Salt Lake City, for 
Broadbent & Woolf and Robert M. Woolf 
Ray R. Christensen, Salt Lake City, for Dow 
Corning Corporation 
Michael E. Reed, Diane M. Kehl, Chicago, 
and Elliott J. Williams, Larry R. Laycock, 
Salt Lake City, for American Society of 
Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons and Dr. 
Goldwyn 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
Plaintiff Celia Anderson ("Anderson") 
appeals the dismissal of her complaint against 
defendants American Society of Plastic and 
Reconstructive Surgeons, Inc. ("ASPRS"), and 
Dr. Robert Goldwyn ("Goldwyn") (collectively 
"defendants") for lack of personal jurisdic-
tion. The other defendants have not contested 
jurisdiction. This appeal follows trial court 
certification of its interlocutory order under 
rule 54(b) of our rules of civil procedure. We 
vacate the trial court's order of dismissal as to 
both ASPRS and Goldwyn and remand for 
triai on the merits, with an order to postpone 
any ruling on personal jurisdiction until after 
plaintiff has presented her case. 
Anderson's claims arise out of experimental 
therapy she received for a disfiguring condi-
tion of her face. The therapy consisted of 
injections of an experimental liquid silicone 
product into her face. The liquid silicone was 
produced by Dow Corning Corp. ("Dow") and 
injected by Dr. Robert Woolf ("Woolf") (both 
defendants, but not parties to this appeal). 
Anderson reacted severely to the silicone, 
ociety of Plastic Surgeons
 t 
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I became grossly disfigured, and suffered a 
great deal of pain. She filed suii against Dow, 
Woolf, and Wooif's professional corporation 
for damages, alleging \arious causes of action. 
During discovery, Anderson found out that 
ASPRS was involved with Dow m setting up 
and running the experimental silicone injection 
program. She also learned that Goldwyn was 
the medical monitor in charge of ensuring that 
each patient admitted to the program fell 
within the FDA guidelines, was an appropriate 
subject for the experimental therapy, and 
received appropriate follow-up care in the 
event of complications. She found that he also 
supervised much of the medical record keeping 
for the program and performed various other 
functions. 
Anderson amended her complaint to include 
ASPRS and Goldwyn, claiming that she 
should not have received the experimental 
therapy because she did not fit the program's 
patient profile, that ASPRS-with Dow-
violated federal drug law, that she did not give 
informed consent for the therapy because of 
defendants' and Dow's preparation of a 
defective informed consent form, and that 
Goldwyn was negligent in performing his 
monitoring duties. 
Defendants moved io dismiss Anderson's 
complaint against them for lack of personal 
junsdiction pursuant to rule l2lbX2) of our 
rules of civil procedure. They argued that their 
conduct did not fall within the activities listed 
in Utah's long-arm statute and that they had 
( insufficient contacts with this forum for it to 
assen jurisdiction compatible with due process 
requirements. 
The trial court ruled on defendants' motion 
based on the pleadings and documentary evi-
dence, including depositions and affidavits, it 
concluded that to assen jurisdiction over 
defendants would offend due process. It did 
not make any findings of fact, but in light of 
conflicts in the documentary evidence before 
it, we conclude that the coun necessarily 
weighed the facts in order to reach its concl-
usions. 
Anderson's allegation that the district court 
can assert specific personal jursidiction over 
ASPRS and Goldwyn under our long-arm 
statute, Utah Code Ann. §78-27-24 (1987), 
requires a two-pan inquiry. See, e.g., Brad-
ford v.Nagle. 763 P.2d 791, 793 (Utah 1988). 
First, do her claims arise from one of the 
activities listed in the statute? And second, are 
defendant's contacts with this forum sufficient 
to satisfy the due process clause of the fourt-
eenth amendment if the trial coun exercises 
jurisdiction? An additional preliminary ques-
tion is, what burden must a plaintiff bear to 
show that the triai coun has personal jurisdi-
ction over a defendant? We will address the 
preliminary question first. 
In Roskcllcy & Co. v. Lerco, Inc., 610 P.2d 
1307 (Utah 1980). we held that in a pretrial 
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determination of jurisdiction, a plaintiff 
cannot rely on allegations made in the comp-
laint if the defendant has specifically contro-
verted alleged jurisdictional facts by affidavit. 
Id. at 1310. However, we did not answer the 
question of how to resolve factual disputes-
such as conflicts between one witness's dep-
osition and another's affidavit-nor did we 
decide how to proceed when jurisdiction turns 
on the same facts as the merits of the case. 
Both of these problems occur in Andersons 
case. 
We have not had occasion to address these 
issues before, but the federal courts have done 
so. Because our rule 12 is patterned after the 
corresponding federal rule and because the 
federal courts routinely apply state long-arm 
statutes to determine the limits of their own 
jurisdiction, the federal courts' reasoning is 
helpful. The following is our synthesis of tenth 
circuit reasoning on these issues as set forth by 
five representative cases. See Ten Mile Indus. 
Park v. Western Plains Serw Corp., 810 F.2d 
1518, 1524 (10th Cir. 1987); Behagen v. 
Amateur Basketball Ass'n, 744 F 2d 731, 733 
(10th Cir. 1984), cerr. denied, 471 U.S. 1010 
(1985); Milligan v. Anderson, 522 F.2d 1202, 
1207 (10th Cir. 1975); Schramm v. Oakes, 352 
F.2d 143, 149 (10th Cir. 1965); Sova Mud 
Corp. v. Fletcher, 648 F. Supp. 1123, 1124-
25 (D.Utah 1986). 
The approach taken by the federal courts is 
motivated by concern for flexibility, judicial 
economy, and preservation of substantial 
rights. In the federal trial court's discretion, 
under rule 12 it may determine jurisdiction on , 
affidavits alone, permit discovery, or hold an | 
evidentiary hearing. If it proceeds on docum- j 
entary evidence alone (i.e., the first two j 
methods), the plaintiff is only required to 
make a prima facie showing of personal juri-
sdiction. The plaintiff's factual allegations are 
accepted as true unless specifically controve-
rted by the defendant's affidavits or by dep-
ositions, but any disputes in the documentary 
evidence are resolved in the plaintiffs favor. 
The trial court must not weigh the evidence 
unless a hearing is held. 
Unless an evidentiary hearing is held, the 
plaintiff must prove jurisdiction at trial by a 
preponderance of the evidence after making a 
prima facie showing before trial. When juris-
diction turns on the same facts as the merits 
of the case, an evidentiary hearing is inappr-
opriate because it infringes on the right to a 
jury trial and is an inefficient use of judicial 
resources (hearing the same evidence twice); in 
such cases-if the plaintiff has made a 
prima facie showing-jurisdiction is deter-
mined by trial on the merits. Pretrial jurisdi-
ctional decisions based on documentary evid-
ence are reviewed de novo by the federal 
appellate courts. 
We approve these guidelines as suitable for 
.our trial courts. Applying them to Anderson's 
Coot•co 
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case, we hold that she need only have made a 
prima facie showing that the trial court had 
personal jurisdiction over defendants in order 
to proceed to trial on the merits. Because the 
facts on which personal jurisdiction over def-
endants is asserted overlap the facts that will 
determine whether defendants are liable to 
Anderson, it was proper for the trial court to 
rule on personal jurisdiction based only on 
documentary evidence. 
The next issue is whether defendants' 
actions with respect to Anderson fall within 
the activities enumerated in our long-arm 
statute. The trial court did not rule on this 
issue; it based its ruling on due process cons-
iderations only. Defendants argue thai they 
did not "caus(ej any injury within this state" 
as required by the statute in tort and breach oi 
warranty cases. Utah Code Ann. §78-27-
24(3) (1987). Although we often assume the 
application of the statute-and go straight 
to the due process issue-becausc our legi-
slature has directed us to construe it "so as to 
assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants 
to the fullest extent permitted by the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution," Utah Code 
Ann. §78-27-22 (1987); see Parry v. Ernst 
Home Center Corp., 779 P.2d 659, 661 (Utah 
1989), we do not do so here. Whether defen-
dants caused injury to Anderson is the central 
question on the merits of her claims. She is 
entitled to have a jury answer that question if 
she produces sufficient evidence. See Utah 
Code Ann. §§78-21-1,-2 (1987). 
Anderson has made a prima facie showing 
that defendants caused her injuries. She has 
alleged that she should not have been accepted 
into the program, and deposition testimony 
shows that she did not fit the program's 
patient profile. Other documentary evidence 
shows that it was Goldwyn's responsibility to 
make sure that all patients admitted to the 
program fit the profile. This evidence supports 
a prima facie case of negligence against 
Goldwyn and an inference that ASPRS may 
have been negligent in its supervision of 
Goldwyn or in preparing guidelines for him. 
There is documentary evidence that ASPRS 
participated in the program with Dow as a 
cosponsor and that both may have violated 
duties imposed by federal drug law. There is 
further evidence that ASPRS participated with 
Dow and Goldwyn in preparing the consent 
form used by physicians participating in the 
program. Anderson has alleged that she would 
not have been injured because she would not 
have accepted the therapy if the consent form 
had disclosed the true nature of the risks. The 
sum of this and other evidence is that Ande-
rson has made a prima facie showing that 
defendants caused injuries to her in this state. 
The last issue is whether defendants have 
sufficient minimum contacts with this forum 
to make exercising jurisdiction over them 
comport with the demands ot due process 
imposed by the fourteenth amendment (neither 
party briefed state constitutional due process 
issues). The trial court based its decision on 
due process, and defendants make their main 
argument based on due process. Defendants 
argue, and the trial court ruled, that they lack 
sufficient contacts with Utah and this litiga-
tion to be subject to personal jurisdiction here. 
We last renewed due process requirements 
for personal jurisdiction in Parry v. Ernst 
Home Center.* Our analysis is the same here. 
Defendants' contacts with Utah must be "such 
that the maintenance of the suit does not 
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) 
(quoting MUliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457. 463 
(1940)). Defendants must have "reasonably 
anticipate(dj being haled into court" here, 
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 
AM U.S. 286, 297 (1980), and they must have 
"purposefully avail[cdj" themselves of the 
privilege of conducting activities here. Hanson 
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). The trial 
court must also balance "the convenience of 
the parties" and weigh this forum's interest in 
asserting jurisdiction. Mallory Eng'g, Inc. v. 
Ted R. Brown & Assoc, 618 P.2d 1004, 1008 
(Utah 1980); see also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. 
v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987). 
After reviewing the record in light of the 
standards articulated above, we hold that 
Anderson has made a prima facie showing 
that defendants had sufficient contacts with 
Utah and this litigation for assertion of pers-
onal jurisdiction consistent with due process. 
Facts supporting this conclusion include the 
following: ASPRS--(l) its committee sele-
cted Salt Lake City as a program site. (2) its 
committee selected Woolf as a program phy-
sician, (3) it assisted in preparing the consent 
form which it knew would be used in Utah. 
(4) it (with Dow) selected Goldwyn as monitor 
of treatment in the program, including antic-
ipated treatment in Utah, (5) it investigated 
the potential for malpractice claims, including 
those that might arise in Utah, and (6) it 
trained Woolf, knowing he would use that 
training in Utah; Goldwyn-(l) helped draft 
the consent form, (2) supervised the proper 
administration of the treatment program in 
Utah, (3) authorized Anderson's silicone inj-
ections, and (4) assumed responsibility to 
monitor Anderson's treatment and to follow 
up if there were problems. 
The foregoing facts show purposeful acts 
with known, significant consequences in Utah. 
Utah's interest in protecting Anderson from 
injury is compelling. Balancing all of the 
competing interests, we hold that it is fair to 
require defendants to subject themselves to 
trial in a Utah court for the purpose of dete-
rmining whether Anderson can prove jurisdi-
ction, and hence liability (namely, that defe-
LTAH ADVAiN 
naants caused her injury and damages). 
We vacate dismissal and remand to the trial 
court for trial on the merits. Because the facts 
supporting jurisdiction overlap the facts sup-
porting liability, the trial court must allow 
defendants to renew their motion to dismiss 
for lack of jurisdiction at the close of Ande-
rson's evidence. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
Richard C. Howe, Associate Chief Justice 
I. Daniel Stewart, Justice 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice 
1. Although not relevant to this case, we acknowl-
edge ihe issues raised about this ca^c b> the comm-
entary in Note, Parry v. Ernst Home Center Corp-
oration: The "Mauling" of Personal Jurisdiction 
Theory, 1990 Utah L. Re\. 479 (authored b> Marc 
Young). 
DemetroDOulos v. Vreeken, 75 4 P2d 960 (Utah Ct. ADD. 1988) 4 , 6 , 1 2 
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Dale and Kathy 
DEMETROPOULOS, Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Fred VREEKEN, et al., Defendants. 
Deseret Bank, Garnishee. 
BJ. RONE, Plaintiff in Intervention 
and Appellant, 
• . 
Dale and Kathy DEMETROPOULOS, 
Defendants in Intervention and 
Respondents. 
No. 860031-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
May 11, 1988. 
Creditors disputed relative priority of 
their prejudgment writs of attachment and 
garnishment. The Fourth District Court, 
Utah County, George F. Ballif, J., held for 
first creditor, and appeal was taken. The 
Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that even 
if judgment creditors' prejudgment writ of 
attachment was invalid, their postjudgment 
writ of garnishment had priority over sec-
ond creditor's prejudgment writ of garnish-
ment where second creditor's judgment 
against debtors was invalid for lack of jur-
isdiction due to insufficiency of service of 
process. 
Affirmed. 
Jackson, J., concurred and filed opin-
ion. 
2. Garnishment <s=107 
Even if judgment creditors' prejudg-
ment writ of attachment was invalid, their 
postjudgment writ of garnishment had pri-
ority over second creditor's prejudgment 
writ of garnishment for second creditor's 
judgment against debtors was invalid for 
lack of jurisdiction due to insufficiency of 
service of process; second creditor's pre-
judgment writ of garnishment was provi-
sional remedy which did not itself entitle 
second creditor to provisionally garnished 
property. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 64D(a)(i). 
George M. McCune, Salt Lake City, for 
appellant, Rone. 
Robert H. Wilde, Murray, for respon-
dent, Demetropoulos Cook & Wilde. 
Before ORME, JACKSON and 
BILLINGS, JJ. 
OPINION 
ORME, Judge: 
This case involves a dispute over the 
validity of respondents' prejudgment writ 
of attachment and the priority of appel-
lant's prejudgment writ of garnishment 
Despite the inadequacy of appellant's brief, 
we reach the merits of his appeal and af-
firm. 
DEMETROPOULOS v. VREEKEN 
Cite ai 754 ?2d 960 (Utah App. 19S8) 
Utah 963 
MERITS OF APPEAL 
Appellant has set forth various "facts" 
in his brief. He has not, however, "mar-
shalled] all the evidence in support of the 
trial court's findings and then demon-
strate^] that even viewing it in the light 
most favorable to the court below, the evi-
dence is insufficient to support the find-
ings." Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 
1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). Accordingly, "we 
take as our starting point the trial court's 
findings8 and not [appellant's] recitation of 
the facts." IcL 
Respondents Dale and Kathy Demotropo-
lous filed their action against various de-
fendants and obtained a prejudgment writ 
of attachment. The same was served on 
Deseret Bank on April 12, 1983, as Deseret 
Bank held certain accounts in the names of 
some of the defendants. Appellant BJ. 
Rone, a creditor of some or all of these 
same defendants, then filed his own civil 
action and obtained a prejudgment writ of 
garnishment. He served the bank eleven 
days later. Before respondents' writ ex-
pired, it was extended twice, the second 
time indefinitely, "pending a request by the 
Defendants to have the matter heard." 
Respondents obtained judgment by default 
against defendants and, in execution of the 
judgment, promptly served the bank with a 
post-judgment writ of garnishment. Ap-
pellant obtained a default judgment in the 
action he filed a few weeks later. 
Appellant intervened in the action re-
spondents filed to assert his entitlement to 
the accounts.9 Intervention was denied by 
the district court, but was subsequently 
permitted pursuant to a writ of mandamus 
issued by the Utah Supreme Court Appel-
the alleged fraud.- Id at 1185. Nonetheless, 
the panel was apparently not comfortable in 
premising its affirmance solely on that ground 
and went on to conclude that affirmance was 
also warranted on statute of limitation grounds. 
Id at 1185-46. 
8. We do so only insofar as the findings of fact, 
found both in the court's memorandum deci-
sion and its formal "Findings of Fact," are really 
that Some of the "facts" set forth in the find-
ings, prepared by respondents' counsel, are ac-
tually conclusions of law or else so broadly 
phrased as to be unhelpful. Finding #3, for 
example, reads as follows: That the Plaintiffs' 
Prejudgment Writ of Attachment was substan-
lant's initial foray into the action was sub-
sequently nullified because of his failure to 
comply with Utah R.Civ.P. 24(c) following 
issuance of the writ of mandamus. Vari-
ous papers filed by him were stricken by 
court order because he had not first filed a 
complain: in intervention and paid the nec-
essary fHng fee. These oversights were 
ultimately corrected. The ancillary pro-
ceeding which was begun with appellant's 
complaint in intervention ultimately culmi-
nated in a judgment dismissing that com-
plaint. It is from that judgment that appel-
lant Rone appeals. 
[2] Appellant claims priority to the ac-
counts in question due to various alleged 
deficiencies in connection with respondents' 
prejudgment writ of attachment Respon-
dents strive to demonstrate that their pre-
judgment writ was proper in every material 
respect, but also attack the validity of ap-
pellant's prejudgment writ of garnishment 
and his default judgment Their basic posi-
tion is that even if their prejudgment writ 
was flawed, appellant's has come to have 
no force or effect, leaving respondents' 
post-judgment writ of garnishment the 
first, clearly valid levy on the accounts held 
by Deseret Bank. 
The trial court's findings support the 
conclusion that appellant's prejudgment 
writ of garnishment does not have prece-
dence ovo" respondents' post-judgment writ 
of garnishment, making it unnecessary for 
us to decade whether respondents' prejudg-
ment writ of attachment was valid 
Appellant purported to serve the defend-
ants he named in his action, including the 
tively and procedurally proper and correct in all 
relevant respects." 
9. AppeHzzi and respondents were victims of the 
same irastment scam. It is regrettable that, 
having bcci succeeded in finding a liquid asset 
of defencasis at about the same time, they were 
unable to devise an equitable method of sharing 
the prize rather than engaging in a costly, "win-
ner-take^r contest. Astoundingly, in view of 
the mocks size of the garnished accounts and 
amounts iivested, their procedural battles gen-
erated sooe seven hundred pages in court fil-
ings. 
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defendants whose accounts were gar-
nished, by service upon one Keith Vreeken, 
who was not himself named as a defend-
ant.10 However, the court noted in its 
memorandum decision that "[n]o proof ex-
ists in the record other than the constable's 
guess that Keith Vreeken was the agent of 
or had any managerial control for the busi-
ness entities" whose accounts were seized. 
The court formally found that Keith Vreek-
en was not "an officer, managing agent, 
general agent or any other agent autho-
rized to receive service for any relevant 
Defendant herein nor that he was a clerk, 
cashier, chief clerk [or] person having the 
management, direction or control of any 
property of any such Defendant" There is 
adequate support in the record for this 
finding. The defendants in question were 
found to be "sole proprietorships," not cor-
porations, and no assumed name certifi-
cates or filings of any son had been made 
concerning them. Thus, no public record 
showed that Keith Vreeken was registered 
agent for them or otherwise affiliated with 
them. The bank's representative testified 
that Keith Vreeken was not on the signa-
ture cards for the accounts, although oth-
ers with that same last name apparently 
were.11 
Appellant disputes the finding concern-
ing Keith Vreeken's status, but also con-
tends that any problems with his service of 
process on the defendants are inconsequen-
tial since service of his prejudgment writ of 
garnishment was duly made on the bank. 
This fact does not save appellant A pre-
judgment writ of garnishment is a provi-
sional remedy only, "available as a means 
10. Appellant named as defendants Kurt Vreek-
en, an individual, doing business under various 
assumed names; Fred Vreeken, an individual, 
doing business under those same names; "busi-
ness entities" corresponding to Kurt and Fred 
Vreeken's assumed names; John Andrews, Rick 
Ramsey and Jerry Pitts, under various assumed 
names; Financial Development Group, a busi-
ness entity, and "several John Does, whose 
names are not yet known," The Deseret Bank 
accounts stood in the names under which Kurt 
and Fred Vreeken allegedly did business. 
11. It is worth noting that one of them, Kurt 
Vreeken, had been served by the constable used 
by appellant on at least one prior occasion. 
of attachment of intangible property . . . 
before judgment, in cases in which a writ 
of attachment is available under Rule 64C." 
Utah R.Civ.P. 64D(a)(i). Such a prejudg-
ment writ merely commands the garnishee 
to retain the property "until further order 
of the court." Utah R.Civ.P. 64D(eXi). 
Only if the plaintiff ultimately obtains a 
valid judgment against the defendant is he 
or she entitled to some or all of the provi-
sionally garnished property.12 See Utah 
R.Civ.P. 64D(j)- See also Utah R.Civ.P. 
64C(k). 
In this case, the court properly concluded 
that the default judgment obtained by ap-
pellant in the action he filed was invalid for 
lack of jurisdiction due to the insufficiency 
of service of process on the defendants in 
that action. The provisional remedy of a 
prejudgment writ of garnishment in that 
same action ceased to have any further 
effect upon entry of that "judgment" l3 and 
could be properly disregarded by the court 
in determining who was entitled to the 
accounts, leaving respondents entitled to 
the accounts pursuant to their post-judg-
ment writ of garnishment 
One further point raised by appellant 
merits comment Appellant contends that 
the court erred in not granting his post-tri-
al motion to amend the return of service on 
Keith Vreeken. It is suggested that if the 
return were amended, it would demon-
strate that service on the defendants was 
actually proper, meaning appellant's judg-
ment was valid and his prejudgment writ 
entitled to recognition. We are not per-
12. wtG]arnishment to enforce a final judgment 
should be distinguished from the provisional 
remedy of garnishment before trial, which is 
aimed at preserving assets of the debtor until a 
final decision can be had on the merits." D. 
Dobbs, Remedies 11 (1973). 
13. As provided in Rule 64A, appellant's prejudg-
ment writ of garnishment recited that it would 
expire in ten days from issuance unless extend-
ed. Utah R.CivJ\ 64A(3). Defendants did not 
appear at the hearing on whether the writ 
should be continued and, accordingly, by order 
entered at that hearing, the writ was continued 
"in full force and effect during the pendency [of 
appellant's action] or until further order of the 
court." 
suaded. Any error in disallowing the 
amendment was harmless since the con-
stable testified at length concerning the 
circumstances of service on Keith Vreeken. 
Accordingly, all relevant information was 
before the court anyway. Moreover, we 
find it difficult to see how appellant can 
complain in this appeal about a ruling on a 
motion that would have been properly 
raised, if at all, in another action, namely 
the one he brought and in which the return 
was filed. 
The judgment appealed from is affirmed. 
BILLINGS, J., concurs. 
JACKSON, Judge (concurring): 
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Defendant keith Reed (herematter 
"defendant") appeals the trial court s order 
and judgment denving a motion to quash 
service of summons upon him and the default 
judgment entered against him 
Plaintiff and defendant were granted a 
divorce on April 15, 1987, in the Fourth 
Judicial Distnct Court, Utah County Under 
the terms of the divorce, plaintiff was awarded 
items of personal property, including a travel 
trailer and a four wheel-drive pickup truck, 
neither of which was surrendered to plaintiff 
in a timely manner The trailer was eventually 
returned to plaintiff by defendant's parents, 
Memll Reed and Georga Reed, also named 
defendants in this matter 
On May 8, 1988, in an effort to recover the 
pickup truck, plaintiff caused the shenff to 
serve the subject summons upon defendant 
and his parents at his parents' home in Orem, 
Utah, where defendant had resided during the 
pendency of the divorce At the time of 
service, the shenff was informed by the 
parents that defendant no longer lived at the 
residence and that they did not know where he 
was but thought he was out of the state The 
sheriff nevertheless left defendant's copy of 
the summons at the parents home and com-
pleted a return of service 
On May 25, 1988. defendant appeared spe-
cially and filed a motion to quash service He 
included with the motion affidavits from 
himself and his parents stating that he did not 
live with his parents and that the service of 
process was not made at his usual place of 
abode 
Plaintiff filed a counter affidavit stating 
that she saw defendant in Provo City, a city 
next lo Orem, on May 7, 1988, the day before 
service at his parents' home and again on May 
12, 1988, a few days after service In addition j 
Treasa Norton the daughter of plaintiff and I 
defendant also executed an affidavit stating | 
that she had seen defendant on April 26, 1988, 
in the vicinity of Orem some two weeks before 
service of process 
On August 1, 1988 defendant requested an 
evidentiary hearing on the issue of service At 
the hearing, which was held on September 26, 
1988, defendant presented no evidence of his 
usual place of abode Plaintiff, however, 
presented evidence that defendant had listed 
his parents' home as his residence on his 1986 
and 1987 tax returns in addition to the infor-
mation contained in the affidavits 
In a ruling dated October 3, 1988, the dist 
net court made findings of fact and conclus-
ions of law and denied the motion to quash 
service An amended default judgment was 
subsequently entered against defendant on 
November 2, 1988, on the action to recover 
the truck On August 4, 1989 defendant filed 
a notice of appeal challenging the October 3, 
1988 ruling and the November 2, 1988 judg-
ment 
Two issues are presented on appeal first, 
whether the notice of appeal was filed in a 
timely manner and, second, whether defendant 
was properly served 
I. NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Plaintiff asserts that the court lacks junsd 
iction to hear this appeal because defendant 
failed to file his notice of appeal in a timely 
manner Rule 4 of the Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court governs filing of a notice of 
appeal and states 
(a) Appeal from final judgment 
and order In a case in which an 
appeal is permitted as a matter of 
right from the distnct court to the 
Supreme Court, the notice of 
appeal required by Rule 3 shall be 
filed with the clerk of the distnct 
court within 30 days after the date 
of entry of the judgment or order 
appealed from 
Plaintiff asserts that because the notice of 
appeal was filed on August 4, 1989, and the 
amended judgment against defendant was 
entered on November 2, 1988, the time for 
filing an appeal had lapsed Plaintiff misapp-
rehends the procedural posture of this case 
Final judgment was not entered against Keith 
Reed until judgment was entered against the 
co-defendants, his parents Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 54(b) states 
(b) Judgment upon multiple 
claims and/or involving multiple 
parties When more than one claim 
for relief is presented in an action 
and/or when multiple parties 
are involved, the court may direct 
the entry of a final judgment as to 
one or more but fewer than all of 
the claims or parties only upon an 
express determination by the court 
that there is no just reason for 
delay and upon an express direction 
for the entry of judgment In the 
absence of such determination and 
direction, any order or other form 
of decision, however designated, 
which adjudicates fewer than all the 
claims or the rights and liabilities of 
fewer than all the parties shall not 
terminate the action as to any of 
the claims or parties, and the order 
or other form of decision is subject 
to revision at any time before the 
entry of judgment adjudicating all 
the claims and the nghts and liabi-
lities of all the parties » 
It is undisputed that no 54(b) motion was 
made requesting the court to certify the 
amended default judgment against Keith Reed 
as final Final judgment was entered in favor 
of Merrill Reed and Georga Reed, the co-
defendants, on July 11 19892 Because the 
nonce of appeal was filed within 30 days of 
the final judgment, we are not without juns-
diction to hear this appeal 
II. SERVICE OF PROCESS 
Defendant claims that service was defective 
because the sheriff left the summons at his 
parents' home and it was not his usual place 
of abode Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 4<e)(l) 
governs service of process and states that 
service is perfected when made "Iu]pon a 
natural person of the age of 14 years or over, 
by delivering a copy thereof to him personally, 
or by leaving such copy at his usual place of 
abode with some person of suitable age and 
discretion there residing 
The determination of "usual place of 
abode" is a mixed question of law and fact 3 
Here, the district court made explicit findings 
of fact and conclusions of law in ruling on the 
motion to quash The court found, inter aha, 
that all defendants claimed that Keith Reed no 
longer lived with his parents, that plaintiff 
observed Keith Reed on May 7 and May 12 
driving in town, that Keith Reed was person 
ally seen by Treasa Norton on April 26 dnvmg 
the truck in question, that sometime after 
February 5, 1988, Keith Reed filed his 1987 
income tax return indicating his parents' 
address to also be his address, and that not 
later than June 8, 1988, Keith Reed became 
aware of the process served upon his parents 
on May 8, 1988 However, it is apparent that 
he became aware of the service sometime prior 
to May 25, 1988, since he filed a motion to 
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quash service on that day 
The district court's findings of fact are 
based upon a judgment of the credibility of 
the witnesses It is the province of the trier of 
fact to assess the credibility of witnesses, and 
we will not second guess the trial court where 
there is a reasonable basis to support its fin-
dings 4 In order to challenge the court's fin 
dings of fact, the defendant must marshal all 
of the evidence in favor of the findings and 
then demonstrate that even when reviewing the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the court 
below, the evidence is insufficient to support 
the findings 5 Defendant has not shouldered 
the burden necessary to overturn the findings 
of the trial court 
The district court's determination of 
whether, under the facts presented, defen-
dant's parents' home fits within the definition 
of the usual place of abode is a question of 
law When reviewing the district court s con-
clusions of law, we give no deference to the 
court but review those conclusions for corre-
ctness « 
The district court relied on the case of Grant 
y Lawrence1 for the de f in i t i on of 
'usual place of abode " In Grant v Lawrence, 
this court stated 
Usual place of abode is sometimes 
referred to as being synonvmous 
with domicile or permanent resid 
ence In our judgment there is a 
broad distinction between diraicile 
[sic] and usual place of abode as the 
latter term is used in our statute 
That is, where a person abides-
bves—at the particular time when 
the summons is served, constitutes 
his usual place of abode • 
Neither party disputes the fact that the 
sheriff left the summons at the home of def-
endant's parents and made the required return 
of service thereon • The shenfrs return of 
service of process is presumptively correct and 
is prima facie evidence of the facts stated 
therein Stated negatively, the rule is that it is 
not to be presumed that an officer in serving 
process failed to discharge his duty w Thus, 
the burden was upon defendant to prove that 
service was improper Indeed, it was defendant 
who requested the September 26, 1988 evide-
ntiary hearing At the hearing, defendant had 
the opportunity to present evidence of his true 
place of abode, if m fact it differed from that 
of his parents This he failed to do Faced 
with those facts, the district court concluded 
that the parents' home was defendant's usual 
place of abode 
Since the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
were patterned after the federal rules, we may 
examine federal decisions to determine the 
meaning of the rules " In Nowell v Nowell,12 
the federal Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit construed a similar federal provision 
and noted 
(Nlo hard and fast rule can be fas-
hioned to determine what is or is 
not a party's "dwelling house or 
usual place of abode* within the 
rule's meaning, rather the practic-
alities of the particular fact situa-
tion determine whether service 
meets the requirements of 4(d)( 1) 
{line provision concerning 
usual place of abode should 
be [construed liberally] to 
effectuate service if actual 
notice has been received by 
the defendant and that in the 
last analysis the question of 
service must be resolved by 
"what best serves to give 
notice to a defendant that he 
is being served with process, 
considering the situation from 
a practical standpoint " u 
We also give the Utah Rules of Civil Proc-
edure liberal construction M Considering the 
totality of the circumstances-the facts that 
plaintiff demonstrated defendant's presence in 
the community, that defendant listed his home 
address as that of his parents, had resided 
there during the pendency of the divorce, and 
failed to show that he lived elsewhere-the 
district court was justified in concluding that 
defendant's parents' home was his usual place 
of abode and that it was, m fact, the place 
where he lived In addition, the likelihood of 
defendant appearing at the place of service in 
the near future, coupled with the absence of a 
permanent residence elsewhere, is sufficient to 
uphold service made at a residence maintained 
with a member of defendant's familv even if 
defendant is seldom there u 
Defendant having failed to show proper 
service had not been made upon him, and 
because he, in fact, had timely notice of the 
pendency of the proceedings, the trial court 
did not err in denying the motion to quash 
Affirmed 
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State v. Tinnin, 232 P 543 (Utah 1925) 
STATE v. TINNIN. (No. 4173.) 
(Supreme Court of Utah. Jan. 5,1925.) 
1. False pretenses <S=7 (2)—-Contract entered 
under "fictitious" name valid. 
Contract entered into under fictitious name 
is valid, law looking at identity of individual, 
not the name he has assumed; "fictitious'' 
meaning feigned, imaginary, not real, counter-
feit, fake, not genuine. 
[Ed. Note.—For other definitions, see Words 
and Phrases, First and Second Series, Ficti-
tious.] 
2. False pretenses <s=7 (2)—Conviction of fel-
ony, where accused signed fictitious name to 
sight draft, sustained. 
Where accused passed sight draft signed by 
fictitious name as his own, conviction for fel-
ony, under Comp. Laws 1917, | S2*76\ instead oi 
for misdemeanor under section 8347, was 
proper. 
Appeal from District Court, Weber Coun-
ty; J. N. Kimball, Judge. 
Nelson G. Tinnin was convicted of crime 
of felony, and he appeals. Affirmed. 
D. L. Oleson, of Salt Lake City, for appel-
lant 
Harvey H, Cluff, Atty. Gen., and W. Hal. 
Fan, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State. 
ERICKSON, District Judge. In this ac-
tion defendant was convicted in the district 
court of Weber county upon a charge of fel-
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ony and sentenced to an indeterminate term 
in the state prison of the state of Utah from 
one to ten years, from which judgment of 
conviction and imprisonment he appeals to 
this court. 
The information charges the defendant as 
follows: 
"Nelson G. Tinnin, having heretofore been 
duly committed by D. R. Roberts, a committing 
magistrate of this county, to this court, to an-
swer this charge, is accused by the district at-
torney of this judicial district, by this informa-
tion, of the crime of felony, committed as fol-
lows, to wit: 
"The said defendant on February IS, 1924, at 
the county of Weber, state of Utah, did willful-
ly, unlawfully, fraudulently, and feloniously 
make and pass a certain fictitious instrument in 
writing, purporting to be a sight draft for the 
payment of $320 in money, drawn on the Ogden 
State Bank, a banking corporation with its 
principal place of business in Ogden, Utah', 
signed by R. A. Kennedy and payable to the 
order of Glen Bros. Roberts Piano Company, a 
corporation with its principal place of business 
at Ogden, Utah, with the intent of him the said 
defendant to defraud the said Glen Bros. Rob-
erts Piano Company, there being in existence at 
said time no such person as R. A. Kennedy, 
which the defendant then and there well knew, 
and when the said defendant then and there 
well knew that said purported sight draft was 
fictitious, the same being in words and figures 
following, to wit: 
" 'At sight pay to the order of Glen Bros. 
Roberts Piano Co. three hundred twenty dol-
lars ($320.00). For value received. Write 
name of your bank here: To Ogden State 
Bank, City. Sign here: R. A. Kennedy.' 
"Contrary to the form of the statute in such 
case made and provided, and against the peace 
and dignity of the state of Utah." 
The main and principal contention,of the 
defendant relied upon for a reversal of this 
case is that the evidence in the case does 
not prove the offense described in section 
8276 of the Compiled Laws Utah 1917, of a 
violation of which the defendant was con-
victed, and which section reads as follows: 
"Every person who makes, passes, utters, or 
publishes, with intention to defraud any other 
person, or who, with the like intention, attempts 
to pass, utter, or publish, or who has in his 
possession, with like intent to utter, pass, or 
publish, any fictitious bill, note, or check, pur-
porting to be the bill, note, check, or other 
instrument in writing for the payment of money 
or property of some bank, corporation, co-part- I 
nership, or individual when in fact there is no 
such bank, corporation, co-partnership, or in-
dividual in existence, knowing the bill, note, 
check, or instrument in writing to be fictitious, 
is punishable by imprisonment in the state I 
prison for not less than one nor more than ten 1 
years." 
Appellant contends that if any violation of 
law was proved at all, it could not amount 
to more than the offense designated in sec-
tion 8347 of the said Compiled Laws Utah 
1917, which reads as follows: 
] "Any person who, with intent to defraud, shall 
make or draw or utter or deliver any check, 
draft, or order for the payment of money upon 
any bank or other depositary, knowing at the 
time of such making, drawing, uttering, or de-
livery that the maker or drawer has not suffi-
cient funds in or credit with such bank or other 
depositary for the payment of such check, draft, 
or order in full upon its presentation, shall be 
I guilty of a misdemeanor. The making, drawing, 
j uttering or delivering of such check, draft, or 
I order as aforesaid shall be prima facie evidence 
t of intent to defraud. The word 'credit' as used 
I herein shall be construed to mean an arrange-
ment or understanding with the bank or depos-
i itary for the payment of such check, draft or 
order." 
I The evidence in this case shows that on 
: the 18th day of February, 1924, the defend-
| ant was introduced to one Holland, an em-
ployee of Glen Bros, Roberts Piano Company 
of Ogden, Utah, whereupon the defendant 
| advised Holland that he was desirous of pur-
j chasing a phonograph, after which a phono-
graph was purchased, valued at $310. for 
which he gave in payment therefor his check 
| for $320, receiving in cash $10 out of which 
he expended several dollars for some sheer 
music. The check was signed "R. A. Ken-
nedy" in the presence of Holland and next 
day presented to the Ogden State Bank for 
payment, which was refused because of "R. 
A. Kennedy" not having an account at that 
bank. 
The evidence further shows that - on the 
same day the defendant issued at least two 
other checks to Ogden merchants in payment 
for purchases made and signed the same 
I name, which checks were also presented to 
the bank and payment refused for the same 
reason as given above. 
Shortly after the arrest of the defendant, 
I he admitted that Kennedy was not his true 
fname; that it was a fictitious one; that his 
true name was Tinnin. Also at the arraign-
ment the record shows that defendant stated 
that he was being prosecuted under his true 
name, viz., Tinnin. The evidence also shows 
that he stated that he used the name of 
"Kennedy" because it was "handy." 
We agree with defendant's statement that 
our section 8276 was recently adopted from 
the California Penal Code, § 476, enacted by 
California in 1872. Ours is exactly the same 
with the exception of the penalty, which is 
from one to fourteen years in California, 
and from one to ten years in Utah. The de-
fendant undoubtedly takes the position, as 
claimed by him, that no conviction under 
that section of law has ever been had in the 
state of California wherein a person signed 
a fictitious or assumed name to an instru-
ment and claimed the same to be his own 
name. 
We think there is no question but that it 
has been held by some authorities that an 
instrument supposed to be fictitious must be 
a false instrument, and if it is understood 
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to be the instrument of the one who signs I 
it his use of a fictitious name will not make ] 
it a forgery the credit ha\ing been given 
to him without regard to the name See 
section 764, vol 2 McCain on Criminal Law. 
[1] There is no question in law either, as 
to a contract entered into by a person under 
an assumed or fictitious name being valid. 
The law looks to the identity of the indi-
wdual, and when this is established the act 
is binding upon him and others, irrespective 
of the name he has assumed But here we 
have an action where a person, as appears 
from the ewdence fraudulently and with in- i 
tent to cheat and defraud the said Glen 
Bros Roberts Piano Company, signed a ficti-
tious name to the check and passed it to the 
said companv, and, as stated by himself, he 
used that name because it was "handy " 
We agree with counsel for defendant that 
a person may rightfully assume a name 
which is not his own, as is frequently done 
in good faith, but m this case it appears 
that the defendant was a stranger at Ogden 
and in that vicinity, and that he evidently 
thought and believed and intended that by | 
fc&o^ttfcs fcud ^ m ^ i t e S3,m^ ftcUUous name I 
that it would enable him to prevent identi-
fication of himself later on when the fraud 
had been d scovered, and which he undoubt-
edly knew would soon be discovered 
Webster defines the word "fictitious" to 
mean feigned; imaginary; not real; coun-
terfeit , false; not genuine In People v. 
Eppinger, 105 CaL 36, 38 P. 53S, which is 
a California case cited by appellant, the 
defendant was prosecuted under the Cali-
fornia statute. Section 476 of the Penal Code. 
A reversal was had in the case because of 
certain allegations in the information, but 
the court in said case uses the following 
language: 
"The essence of the offense created by the pro-
visions of section 476 is the making, with an 
mtent to defraud another, of an obligation of 
some 'bank, corporation, copartnership or indi-
vidual,' when in fact there is no such obligor in 
existence " 
The testimony in this case by the assistant 
cashier of the Ogden State Bank is to the 
effect that no such person a s R . A Kennedy 
tuLd or ks$t fcu a s s a r t a t the. bfc.uk \i$oti 
which the check was drawn. 
[2] A careful examination of all of the 
authorities cited by counsel for appellant in 
his brief fails to show that the conviction 
in this case was wrong, but on the contrary, 
we hold that the statute in question was in-
tended by the Legislature to cover just such 
a case as this There was no error com-
mitted by the court in o\erruhng and deny-
ing defendant's motion for a new trial for the 
reasons herein stated 
The judgment of the lower court is af-
firmed 
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TVSBER, C J , and GIDEON, FRICK, and 
CHL"RTt1, 3 J , concur 
TlJURMAN, J , did not participate herein 
